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1st Bn, 12th Inf  
CAMP RADCLIFF, RVN  
201400 Jan 70

OPORD 2-70

Reference: Map, RVN, Series L7014, 1:50,000

Task Organization: No Change

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy forces: Annex A - Intelligence

b. Friendly forces:

(1) 2d Bde conducts offensive operations with two infantry battalions in Southern Base Area 226, to destroy elements of 18th NVA Regt.

(2) 1/22 initiates search and destroy opns in AO RABBIT.

c. Attachments and Detachments: None.

2. (C) MISSION:

To establish Fire Base SHERIDA, and conduct a search and destroy operation in assigned area of operations.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of operation: Annex B, Operation Overlay. Battalion conducts (4) air assaults with C Co into Fire Base SHERIDA, BR691559, initially; B Co into an LZ vic 716553; A Co into an LZ vic 703566; D Co into LZ vic 735572. A 10 minute prep will be fired on each LZ prior to insertion. Priority of fires initially to C Co, Annex C, Fire Support.

b. Co A air assaults into LZ vic 703566 and begins search and destroy operation.

c. Co B air assaults into LZ vic 716553 and begins search and destroy operation.

d. Co C air assaults into FSB SHERIDA vic 691559, and establishes Fire Base security.

e. Co D air assaults into LZ vic 735572 and begins search and destroy operation.

f. Recon Plat air lifts into FSB SHERIDA 691559 and begins RIF operation in assigned sector.

g. Hv Mortar Plat - GS.

h. B/4/42 (DS) airlifted from RADCLIFF initially to FSB SHERIDA. When established in AO priority of fires on order.

OP. 4 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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## d. - Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) ACL for UH-1 aircraft (6) PAX.
- (2) ACL for Chinook CH-47 (32) PAX.
- (3) Air resources available: (10) slicks, (3) hooks, (2) gunships.
- (4) Anticipated duration of operation (10) days.
- (5) All elements will carry as a minimum 3 days rations Class I & Class V.
- (6) Each individual will carry 20 sandbags.
- (7) Each company will carry a sufficient number of axes and D-handle shovels or entrenching tools for every other man.
- (8) Engineers available:
- (9) C Co, as the Fire Base Company only, will displace 81mm mortars and personnel forward of CAMP RADCLIFF. Each man will carry (1) round of 81mm ammunition.
- (10) Pathfinder Control (~~34.50~~<sup>61.05</sup>) - Pathfinder Team controls all Chinook sorties from XYZ pad to FSB SHERIDA.
- (11) Priority of work, Fire Base Company:
  - a. Preparation of area, receipt of hook sorties.
  - b. Defensive positions; sandbagging of CONEX- continuous.
  - c. Defensive wire and devices.
  - d. Cleanup- continuous.
- (12) First CA to start 210800 Jan 70.

## 4. (C) ADMINISTRATION LOGISTICS:

- a. Resupply by helicopter from HARDTIMES.
- b. Mini-trains motor convoy daily to HARDTIMES from Bn TRAINS (CAMP RADCLIFF).
- c. Medevac: Normal dustoff SOP, freq 46.90.

## 5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

- a. Signal: Current SOI in effect, Index 50B-2.
- b. Battalion Command A will be command and control frequency.
- c. Bn CP displaces to FSB SHERIDA after Fire Base Company inserted.

Acknowledge:

COTTINGHAM  
LTC

Annexes: A - Intelligence  
B - Operation Overlay  
C - Fire Support

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Annex A: Intelligence Estimate

Reference: Map sheet RVN, 6737 TIEN THUAN, 1:50,000.

1. Weather:

A. Existing Situation:

- (1) From 20 Jan. to 1 Feb. the weather in the target area will be transitional Monsoon with scattered clouds, early morning fog and isolated rain showers.
- (2) Precipitation: The average rainfall expected for month of Jan. is 4" inches with expected 5 days of precipitation.
- (3) Cloudiness and Ceiling: Cloud conditions will be broken to overcast with bases at 1500 to 2000 feet. During surges ceiling will be lowered to 1000 feet.
- (4) Temperature: For Jan. will run from high of 76 degrees to low of 63 degrees.
- (5) Winds: Winds are normally from North, with velocity ranging up to 8K's.
- (6) Effect on our courses of actions: During periods of limited visibility, thunderstorms and extreme fog, air operations will be handicapped. Cross-country movement will be somewhat restricted during rain showers.

B. Terrain:

(1) Existing Situation: Base Area 226 is primarily a mountainous region with elevations ranging from 200 meters to a maximum of 1000 meters at BR693614. However the southeast corner of the area is a coastal lowland with an average elevation of 50 meters. The Song Con River Valley running north and south in the western portion of the area, is approximately 3 KM wide with an average of 20 meters. The vegetation in the mountainous areas consists primarily of multi-canopied, dense undergrowth forest and brushwoods. Vegetation in the lowland areas is primarily dug crops with some scattered cultivation rice paddies. Rice paddies are predominate in the Song Con River Valley.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action: In the mountainous area cross-country movement conditions will be poor, observation limited to approximately 15 meters and avenues of movement restricted. Concealment from aerial observation is excellent and cover is abundant. The area favors enemy defensive operations but limits use of mortars. In the lowland region, observation and fields of fire are excellent, cover and concealment poor and cross-country movement fair. In the Song Con River Valley, fields of fire and observation are good, cross-country movement is fair. The lowland and the river valley's are more favorable to enemy movement than our own because of their familiarity with the terrain. Night attacks are more likely in these areas than are daylight attacks. Mortars can be easily concealed in the foothills and displaced at night for use against elements and installations in the lowland areas.

(3) Effect on our courses of action: The dense vegetation in the mountainous region will be for LZ's both in size and number. Avenues of egress from the LZ's will be limited. LZ's that are available are surrounded by dense forest which affords the enemy excellent ambush sites. Friendly units are more exposed to night offensive operations and attacks by fire in the lowlands and valleys than they are in the more rugged terrain. Ground-air fire can be expected in any area where clearings exist.

2. Enemy Situation:

A. Composition: The 18th NVA Regt. is composed of three infantry battalions and a service and support companies. The Regt. AO is Binh Dinh (P), with Base Area 226 serving as a training and resupply area. The 8th Bn. operates west of the Song Con River north of highway 19. The 7th Bn. operates in the Binh Khe area, while the 9th Bn. operates south of the highway.

B. Strength: the Regt. strength is approx. 1300. This is broken down as follows:

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## Annex A: Intelligence Estimate

7th Bn. 275, 8th Bn. 275, 9th Bn. 300, HQs and support 470  
C. Mission: The 18th Regt. is responsible for interdiction of highway 19 and anti-pacification. The 8th Bn. and 9th Bn. interdict the highway while the 7th Bn. is responsible for the disruption of the pacification effort in Binh Khe area.

D. Tactics: Formerly the Regt. has carried out regimental sized attacks, but due to tactical and logistical problems this is no longer true. The Regt. has had to resort to using small size units in their operations.

E. Training: The Regt. is trained in coordinate and guerilla type tactics. It is believed that the Regt. is using BA226 for training maneuvers, and political indoctrination sessions.

F. Logistics: The Regt. receives most of its logistical support from the 3rd NVA Div. The 246th Transportation Bn. with a strength of approx. 350 men, carries supplies for the 18th Regt.

G. Combat Effectiveness: The Regt.'s combat effectiveness is limited due to heavy losses incurred since its arrival in South Vietnam, and poor leadership.

H. Morale: Casualties, sickness and lack of supplies has caused low morale in all elements of the Regt.

### 3. Enemy Capabilities:

#### A. Enumeration:

(1) The enemy has the capability to attack population centers, US, GVN, ROKA installations and units and can restrict movement on highway QL 1 and QL 19 by employing ambushes and mines or conducting standoff attacks and raids against friendly convoys and installations in and along those routes. The enemy is capable of conducting sapper and terrorist activities against friendly units along the seacoast.

(2) The enemy can employ chemical agents, using various delivery systems, during any attack.

(3) The enemy can continue disruption of the GVN nation-building effort by assassinations, kidnapping and other terrorist acts.

(4) The enemy can withdraw forces to base areas and sanctuaries for replacement, resupply and retraining.

(5) The enemy is capable of entering outlying villages without opposition or as a result of minor contact to conduct propaganda lectures, recruit personnel, impress civilians as laborers, porters and to obtain provisions and information.

(6) The enemy can establish limited political entities, i.e. peoples' Revolutionary Committees in contested and VC controlled areas.

B. Analysis and Discussion: NVA units continue to remain out of contact and are not expected to engage friendly forces within the next week unless forced to do so. Info from captured document and POW indicate that VC and NVA units are preparing to offensive activity against pacification program and associated allied units in Binh Dinh (P) prior to TET 70, possibly at the end of Jan.

(5) Conclusions: Enemy activity is expected to continue at a reduced level while local forces and NVA units continue to prepare for coordinated offensive actions against QL 19 and the pacification program. Offensive action by allied forces into BA226 will probably be met with limited delaying actions by enemy forces. Ground to air fire as well as mortar fire can be expected against allied forces. Enemy recon elements are expected to stay in close proximity to friendly unit locations and employ sniper tactics whenever the opportunity presents itself.

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


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ANNEX B  
OPORD 2-70  
HQ 1/12

MAP 1:50000 6737



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Annex C (Fire Support, to OPORD 2-70)  
(Reference: Map, RVN, Series L7014, 1:50,000)

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1. (C) SITUATION:
  - a. Enemy Force: See basic OPORD.
  - b. Friendly Forces: See basic OPORD.
2. (C) MISSION: See basic OPORD.
3. (C) EXECUTIVE:
  - a. Concept of Operations: See basic OPORD.
  - b. Air Support: No Change.
  - c. Artillery Support
    - (1) 4/42 FA(-) will provide one btry (B/4/42) for DS to 1/12 Infantry.
    - (2) C/5/16 FA (155mm): GSR 4/42 FA. Priority of fires to troops in contact.
  - d. Coordinating Instructions:
    - (1) 4/42 FA Bn Opns will authorize all expenditures of C/5/16 and will establish a priority of fire as required by the tactical situation.
    - (2) C/6/29 FA (M102) located at LZ HARDTIMES (vic BR616607) and C/7/15 FA (175mm) located at CAMP RADCLIFF (vic BR465467) are available for fire support as required by the tactical situation. Requirement for fires will include nature of target, location, and desired expenditures.
    - (3) Political clearance will be obtained from 2d Bde FSCC through Arty LNO 1/12 Inf.
    - (4) Counter mortar/counter rocket program will be planned by the Arty LNO for CP/Firebase 1/12 Infantry.
    - (5) Air advisories will be posted to 2d Bde FSCC by Arty LNO 1/12 Infantry.
    - (6) NFP allocations requests will be submitted to 4/42 FA Opns by Arty LNO 1/12 Infantry.
4. Administration and Logistics:
  - a. See basic OPORD.
  - b. ASR:
    - (1) 105mm HE: Restriction will be monitored by 4/42 FA Opns.
    - (2) 105mm ILL: Restriction to be monitored by 4/42 FA Opns.
5. Command and Signal:
  - a. Signal: See basic OPORD.
  - b. Command: See basic OPORD.

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Hook Priority

1. S-3 Conex
2. CP Fax
3. Commo Conex
4. 4.2 (Fax)
5. 4.2 (guns & equip)
6. 4.2 Class V-  
400 rounds mixed
7. 4.2 Class V-
8. Class IV  
- to incl 2 pallets C-Rations
9. Class IV
10. Class IV
11. Class V (mixed load) small arms + demo, etc.
12. S-2 Conex
13. Bn CO Conex
14. Water Trailer
15. 300 rounds mixed Class V 81mm



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SP TIME	PZ TIME	ELEMENT	FROM	TO	SORTIES	PAX	NOTES
0630	0800	G Co + 15 Pax CP Grp	Trains	Golf Course	23	117	Incl 3 int 81's
0730	TBA	CP Grp (see attached for names)	Trains	XYZ Pad	1	36	
0830	TBA	Recon Platoon	Trains	Golf Course	6	34	
N/A	N/A	Hook Sorties as described in Appendix A	XYZ	SHERIDA	<del>21</del> 15		
N/A	N/A	Artillery Btry	4/42	SHERIDA	21		
<del>1115</del> <del>1245</del>	<del>1215</del> <del>1345</del>	B Co - by CA	Golf Crs	LZ BR716553	<del>18</del> 19	106	
1300		A Co - by CA	Golf Crs	LZ BR703566	17	100	
1345		D Co - by CA	Golf Crs	LZ BR735572	18	106	

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MISC PAX

CP

LTC Cottingham  
MAJ Axelson  
CPT Cook  
CPT Mellott  
1LT Kline  
SGT Kirk (MAJ A. RTO)  
SP4 Norris (CPT M. RTO)  
SP4 Sarrette (LT K. RTO)  
SP4 Farnum (LT K. RTO)  
(6) PAXs Arty Adv Party

LOH  
Golf Course  
XYZ Pad  
XYZ Pad  
CA  
Golf Course  
XYZ Pad  
CA  
CA  
CA R/L Btry

Commo  
SGT Kuhl  
SP4 McVey  
SP4 Comacho

CA  
CA  
CA

Padmen  
SP4 Edwards  
PFC Dishaw

CA  
CA

Pathfinder

CA

HOOK SORTIE

TOG:CSM Salsgiver  
MSG Allen  
SFC Stanley  
SP4 Deller  
SP4 Plante  
SP4 Brandt (A Co)

Arty LN:SGT Cruise  
SP5 Shetron  
SP4 Rhodes  
PFC Hodges  
Medics:SP6 McAdams  
SP5 Campbell

Comm@:SGT Burwell Barber: SP5 Craemer  
SP4 Rhodes  
SP4 Popick  
SP4 Gaunt  
SFC Lopez  
PFC Gilliam  
Cooks: SP4 Burney  
SP4 Hester

Radar:SGT Smith (E Co)  
SP4 Malcom (E Co)  
SP4 Rose (E Co)  
SP4 Spitler (D Co)  
SGT Ackellund (B Co)

Pad men:SGT Schell (C Co)  
SP4 Russell  
PFC McCoor (E Co)  
PFC Krueger (C Co)

E Co(-): 1LT Jones  
1SG Brown  
SGT Morgan

Pathfinder.

Interpreters: E7 Dau  
E6 Vong

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Map 1 270915 AUG 69  
CRP 1 through 6

Map 2 Artillery Prep VIC 307655

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ANNEX A - OPORD 3-70  
OPERATION OVERLAY  
MAP SHEET SERIES  
6737 III, 1:50,000

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
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A-B ↑  
OLZ

OLZ ↑

Apd ↑

$1/35 = 1/12$



Tourbill

CCG ↓

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