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FROM:
Controlling DoD organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (8 Feb 67) FOR OT
SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division (U) (8)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1966

AD 510787

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION (11) 22 Dec 66 (12) 91 p.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19, and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:


Kenneth G. Wickham (18) OACSFOR
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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
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OPERATIONAL REPORT



LESSONS LEARNED

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AVFA-GC-HIST (22 Dec 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending ~~31 October 1966~~

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96350 19 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) This headquarters concur with the contents of this report except as indicated.

2. (U) Reference Section 1, para 4e (1) (C), page 33. Procedures for processing combat emergency resupply are clearly defined in MACV Directive 55-4, dated 11 Jun 66. A copy of this directive was furnished to G-4, 4th Infantry Division.

3. (U) Reference Section 1, para 8U (4), page 50. Supply control of construction materials has undergone a system change and is now governed by 1st Log Reg 415-2, dated 11 Nov 66.

4. (C) Reference Section 2, para 1j, page 59. Sixty days is considered a minimal amount of time required to provide a degree of unit training, "shake down", POM qualify, and grant POM leaves.

5. (U) Reference Section 2, para 2c, page 61. Regardless of the effectiveness of entrenching machines for use in filling sandbags, it does not appear that fact, in itself, provides adequate justification for MTO&E action to add the item to Engineer Battalion assets.

6. (U) Reference Section 2, para 2d, page 61. Other deployment considerations override the undesirable factors involved in unit arrivals during wet season.

7. (U) Reference Section 2, para 2m, page 63. Cratering charges appears inappropriate for the use described. If the soil condition is appropriate to proper and efficient emplacement of cratering charges by hand, then excavation of emplacements by hand should not be difficult.

8. Reference Section 2, para 4a, page 67. Maps in the L7014 series (current) have been available from Map Depot stocks for some time. Issues have been made to the 4th Infantry Division units in considerable quantity.

9. (U) Reference Section 2, para 4 c & d, page 68. Headquarters, USARV and USMACV are aware of the shortage of US Vietnamese linguists.

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10. (U) Reference Section 2, para 4b, page 74. Provision is made for air-conditioning of fixed communication centers by USAKV Reg 420-54.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William H. James
WILLIAM H. JAMES
Colonel, USAV
Adjutant General

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - - LESSONS LEARNED

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
110 San Francisco 96262

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22 December 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General: For the period covered by this report, the efforts of the Division were directed toward deployment from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The 1st Brigade deployed to the east coast, vicinity TUY HOA; the 2d Brigade and Division Main, to the Central Highlands, vicinity FLEIKU; and the 3d Brigade, to the delta, vicinity SAIGON. The Division (minus the 3d Brigade) is positioned in the II Corps Tactical Zone and is subordinate to I FFORCEV. The 3d Brigade is positioned in the III Corps Tactical Zone and reports to II FFORCEV. For this reason, the activities of the 3d Brigade, following deployment, will not be included in this report.

a. The Division deployed task-organized as follows:

(1) 1st Brigade

HHC, 1st Bde
1/8 Inf
3/8 Inf
3/12 Inf
A Trp, 1/10 Cav
6/29 Arty
A Btry, 5/16 Arty
A Co, 4th Engr Bn
1st Plat, E Co, 4th Engr Bn
1st Bde TAGP
D Co, 704th Maint Bn
B Co, 4th Med Bn
Tn, 4th MI Det
1st Plat, 4th MP Co
1st Plat, Fwd Comm Co, 124th Sig Bn

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Comp Co, 4th S&T Bn
HQ Co
Fwd Sup Sec
GRREG Sec
Class III Sec
Trans Sec
Sec, 4th Admin Co

(2) 2d Brigade

HHC, 2d Bde
2/8 Inf
1/12 Inf
1/22 Inf
B Trp, 1/10 Cav
4/42 Arty
B Co (-), 4th Engr Bn
2d Bde TACP
Tm, 704th Maint Bn (Spt)
Tm, 4th MI Det
2d Plat, 4th MP Co
Tm, Fwd Comm Co, 124th Sig Bn
Fwd Sup Sec (-), 4th S&T Bn
43d Cml Det

(3) 3d Brigade

HHC, 3d Bde
2/12 Inf
2/22 Mech
3/22 Inf
C Trp, 1/10 Cav
2/77 Arty
3d Bde TACP
B Co, 704th Maint
D Co, 4th Med Bn
Tm, 4th MI Det
3d Plat, 4th MP
3d Plat, Fwd Comm Co, 124th Sig Bn
Comp Co, HQ Sec, 4th S&T Bn
HQ Sec
Fwd Sup Sec
GRREG Sec

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Bath Soc
Class III Soc
Trans Soc
Soc, 4th Admin Co

(4) Division Artillery

HHB, Div Arty
5/16 Arty (-)

(5) Division Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
1/10 Cav (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
4th Engr Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn
4th MP Co (-)
4th Admin Co (-)
4th Div TACP
4th MI Det (-)
20th PI Det
21st PI Det
29th Mil Hist Det
43d Cml Det

(6) Support Command

HHC & Band
704th Maint Bn (-)
4th Med Bn (-)
4th S&T Bn (-)

b. Key personnel and positions filled:

(1) Division Headquarters

MG Collins, Arthur S Jr
BG Walkor, Glen D
COL McDowell, William D
LTC Farley, Roy W

CG, 4th Inf Div
ADC
Chief of Staff
AC of S, G1

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LTC Kitchen, Albert B Jr	AC of S, G2
LTC Duquomin, Gordon J	AC of S, G3
LTC Kuckhahn, Karl O	AC of S, G4
LTC Braim, Paul F	AC of S, G5
LTC Friedly, Howard W	IG
LTC Schug, Willis E Jr	SJA
LTC Hess, Frank J	Fin Off
LTC Hett, William R	Chap
LTC Robinson, Herbert A	AG
LTC Kulo, Edwin W	PM
LTC Dycalco, Armin G	Surg
MAJ Henderson, William J	CmlO
MAJ Ansted, Genoa W	DTO
MAJ Zenk, Daniel R	IO

(2) 1st Brigade

BG Byars, David O Jr	CG, 1st Bde
COL Austin, John O	Deputy CO
LTC Leo, Harold H	CO, 1st Bn 8th Inf
LTC Crizer, Pat W	CO, 3d Bn 8th Inf
LTC Peter, David M	CO, 3d Bn 12th Inf
LTC Lennon, Lynwood B	CO, 6th Bn 29th Arty

(3) 2d Brigade

COL Miller, Judson F	CO, 2d Bde
LTC Lounsbury, Roy E	CO, 2d Bn 8th Inf
LTC Lay, James R	CO, 1st Bn 12th Inf
LTC Morley, Leonard A	CO, 1st Bn 22d Inf
LTC Parr, Bertram L	CO, 4th Bn 42d Arty

(4) 3d Brigade

COL Garth, Marshall B	CO, 3d Bde
LTC Fuller, Marvin O	CO, 2d Bn 12th Inf
LTC Clark, Richard W	CO, 2d Bn 22d Mech
LTC Bender, John A	CO, 3d Bn 22d Inf
LTC Rehm, Walter R	CO, 2d Bn 77th Arty

(5) Division Artillery

COL Cutrona, Joseph F H	CO, Div Arty
LTC Citrak, Michael	CO, 5th Bn 16th Arty

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(6) Support Command

COL Boudman, Arthur B	CO, SUPCOM
LTC Richards, William G	CO, 4th S&T Bn
LTC Kouhoukes, Paul C	CO, 704th Maint Bn
LTC Schulz, Bernhard W	CO, 4th Engr Bn
LTC Keefer, Loren R	CO, 124th Sig Bn
LTC Peard, William G	CO, 4th Med Bn
LTC McDowell, William R	CO, 4th Avn Bn
LTC Nutting, Wallace H	CO, 1st Sqdn 10th Cav Regt
CPT Peterson, Kurt S	CO, HHC, 4th Inf Div
CPT Terrell, Edmund D	CO, 4th Admin Co
CPT Sullivan, Gerald A	CO, 4th MP Co

(7) Attached Units

LTC Clark, Clyde O	CO, 1st Bn 69th Arm
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c. Missions: Significant missions assigned to the Division during the reporting period included preparation for and movement to the combat zone, base camp development and defense, route security, civic action and search and destroy operations. On 18 October, the 2d Brigade was tasked to participate in OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV. On 26 October, the 1st Brigade was tasked to participate in OPERATION ADAMS. Both operations extended through the end of the reporting period.

2. (C) Intelligence

a. Activities for the period of this report were initially oriented on training the G2 section and its supporting MI Detachment for operations in the counterinsurgency environment. Emphasis was placed on the collection and collation of data from which intelligence estimates were prepared on potential areas of employment. Liaison was established with in-country intelligence agencies to assure coordinated action in the collection effort and to develop procedures within the Division. Personnel of the MI Detachment gained valuable experience from their association with the 1st Air Cavalry Division in an "on-the-job-training" status during OPERATION PAUL REVERE II.

b. Enemy OB information was initially developed for the II Corps Tactical Zone. Subsequently, emphasis was placed on detailed development of OB files for the areas encompassed by OPERATIONS PAUL REVERE and ADAMS.

(1) Within the II Corps Tactical Zone, OB records were maintained on three divisions, three independent regiments and twelve independent battalions. Each was confirmed as operating within a specific area

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and all known activities of each unit were traced and recorded. Within the PAUL REVERE AO, the 32d, 33d, and 95B Regiments were positively identified.

(2) On 14 and 15 October, a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) from PLEI DJERENG Special Forces Camp engaged an unknown-sized enemy unit west of their camp. On 18 October, reports placed an enemy unit moving into the KONTUM "panhandle" across the SE SAN River, vicinity PLEI DJERENG. In response to the above action and reports, the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and 5d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division were committed. Initial contact was made with elements of the 95B NVA Regiment. Subsequently, contacts were made with elements of the 32d and 33d NVA Regiments. Having found the enemy in division strength, B-52 strikes were made and ground elements maneuvered to assess their results. During the period, enemy forces attacked fire bases and company perimeters with units up to battalion strength. Gradually, enemy forces withdrew north and west across the NAM SATHAY River. Indications are that the enemy's attacks were blocking tactics to allow his forces to withdraw. It appears that the 95B NVA Regiment planned to stage an attack against PLEI DJERENG, while the 32d and 33d NVA Regiments defended the LZs along the SE SAN River, thereby drawing friendly forces to heavily defended LZs. Another regiment (possibly the 66th NVA) was deployed east of the Cambodia/KONTUM Province border with a mission to defend LZs that would be used by forces maneuvering to cut off enemy withdrawal. During withdrawal, this previously uncommitted regiment could block, allowing the 32d, 33d and 95B Regiments to withdraw to Cambodia. At the end of the reporting period, the enemy continued to exfiltrate north and west across the NAM SATHAY River, while 4th Infantry Division units continued to uncover abandoned enemy base areas, supply caches and fortified positions.

(3) OPERATION ADAMS, a search and destroy operation conducted by the 1st Brigade, began on 26 October. Contacts with the enemy were limited to units of squad and platoon size. Intelligence holdings placed the 18B and 95th NVA Regiments, the 30th Main Forces Battalion and the 95th Local Forces Battalion in the AO.

c. During the reporting period, the counterintelligence effort was geared to collection of information on the composition and organization of the VC political infrastructure. A file system was devised whereby new information was verified, patterns developed and "black lists" compiled.

(1) GIA LAI Province is the local infrastructure headquarters and is subordinate to VC Military Region V. It was confirmed that Region V is now under the direct control of HANOI. GIA LAI Province controls eight territorial districts and the special district of PLEIKU City. GIA LAI Province includes PLEIKU Province, as well as portions of KONTUM, BINH, PHU BON AND D. RLAC Provinces. Since VC and RVN boundaries overlap, coordination with two or more RVN provinces or districts is required to act against a single VC province or district.

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(2) During the period 1-20 October, agent reports indicated that the main VC activity was rice collection. The VC infiltrate into villages with small groups and take rice already collected by local cadre.

(3) During the period 25-31 October, agents reported movement of small VC units out of PHU BON, BINH and PHU YEN Provinces into KONTUM, PLEIKU and DARLAC Provinces; NVA cadre working with the VC Military Army; and a VC battalion being organized in Cambodia.

d. Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques:

(1) During OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV the enemy fragmented his forces into squad or platoon-sized units. When lucrative targets appeared, the enemy reassembled his units into a battalion-sized force to achieve mass and firepower. This tactic minimized the enemy's vulnerability to air and artillery. In general, the enemy adhered to Mao Tse Tung's principles of guerrilla warfare: disperse when confronted by superior forces. The enemy made excellent use of natural cover and concealment.

(2) Prisoner of war interrogation reports indicated that the enemy employed small reconnaissance elements to observe and report movement of US units. This enabled the enemy to execute attacks against bivouac areas within thirty minutes to two hours after US forces had closed.

(3) VC activity and NVA integration into VC infrastructure suggest several probable courses of action. The most probable, places the VC in the role of creating multiple incidents to divert US forces, thereby allowing threatened NVA units to exfiltrate.

(4) In OPERATION ADAMS, NVA units have avoided contact by secluding themselves in redoubts that provide concealment from friendly observation and early warning of approaching US forces.

e. The Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, by analysis of PW reports and discussions with tactical commanders, has concluded the following concerning enemy tactics:

(1) Tactic #1

(a) Small enemy reconnaissance units have the mission of following US units and fixing locations of bivouac areas. Locating a US unit, the enemy reconnaissance element withdraws, laying communications wire back to the enemy base camp. Normally, the wire is laid forty to seventy meters from the US perimeter to a like distance from the enemy base camp, the distance depending on prevailing conditions of observation and concealment. This technique reduces the possibility of US forces discovering the wire and following it to the enemy area. If an attack is to be

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launched, the attacking force is guided by the wire to the objective area. The wire is retrieved during the enemy's withdrawal. The enemy commander may elect not to attack, in which case the reconnaissance unit must make every effort to immediately recover the wire to avoid compromise of their base.

(b) Communications wire is only one of several means used to accomplish the same purpose. One captive related that his unit used twigs from a rotten "Ban" tree. These twigs are reputed to emit a dull, detectable glow at night, thereby providing a guide. Another captive disclosed that his mortar squad used strips of bamboo tied to tree trunks approximately one meter from the ground. These also glowed during darkness. Bamboo strips were also used as aiming stakes for mortars. Tests are now being conducted to determine the accuracy of these statements.

(2) Countermeasure #1. Units returning to their base or bivouac should discretely detach an element. This element would vary with the size of the unit. The mission of the detached element is to slip off the trail and pick up enemy reconnaissance units following behind. This could be accomplished a few hours before a unit closes into its bivouac area. If properly executed, the following possibilities exist: ambush of an enemy reconnaissance unit, disruption of possible enemy attack, capture of prisoners and discovery of enemy location.

(3) Tactic #2. Enemy forces normally conduct a thorough reconnaissance of US positions prior to an attack. As opposed to our reliance on sophisticated surveillance methods, the enemy relies almost exclusively upon ground reconnaissance elements and trail watchers.

(4) Countermeasure #2. As units move into an area to prepare for bivouac, the unit should divide into two elements: a "real" element and a "deception" element. The "deception" element should prepare a base area with all the normal noise, while the "real" element moves away 200 to 300 meters to quietly prepare a bivouac site. At dark, the "deception" element stealthily moves to the real site. This deception plan could reap such results as having the enemy conduct a mortar or ground attack against an unoccupied position. In such a circumstance, the enemy would be highly vulnerable to counterattack.

f. Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses:

(1) Personnel:

	PAUL REVERE IV (18-31 October)	ADAMS (26-31 October)	TOTAL
(a) KIA (BC)	138	5	143

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(b) NVAC	13	0	13
(c) VCC	16	0	16
(d) VCS	$\frac{2}{169}$	$\frac{47}{52}$	$\frac{49}{221}$

(2) Weapons:

	PAUL REVERE IV (18-31 October)	ADAMS (26-31 October)	TOTAL
(a) Small Arms	73	4	77
(b) Crew-served	$\frac{7}{30}$	$\frac{0}{4}$	$\frac{7}{84}$

(3) Other Equipment:

(a) Ammunition:

	TOTAL
1. Small arms	4,491 rnds
2. TNT	84 lbs
3. 81/82mm mort	129 rnds
4. 60mm mort	30 rnds
5. Grenades	78
6. B-40 rockets	40 rnds
7. Bangalore torpedos	2
8. RPG-2	28 rnds

(b) Personal Equipment:

1. Packs	22
2. Ponchos (US)	3
3. Helmets (US)	2
4. Gas masks	2
5. Uniforms	10

(c) Material Destroyed:

1. Rice	8.9 tons
2. Huts	338
3. Foot bridges	2
4. Bunkers	36
5. Tunnel complex	1
6. Foxholes	267
7. Boats/Rafts	4
8. Wheat	0.5 tons
9. Buildings	4

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(d) Miscellaneous:

- 1. Gas cans 20
- 2. 5 HP motor 1
- 3. Medical supplies 200 lbs (est)
- 4. Rice 5.7 tons

g. Significant Sources and Collection Techniques:

(1) The G2 section has gathered information and intelligence from a variety of US and GVN military and civilian agencies. Assets within the Division have accounted for a significant portion of the intelligence input; however, these assets were supplemented by INTSU.S, spot reports, special studies and reports provided by higher, lower and adjacent headquarters.

(2) The MI Detachment controls several specialized intelligence collection assets. The detachment's Imagery Interpretation Section in conjunction with the G2 Air, provides terrain intelligence, trail studies and reports of enemy ground activity through the interpretation of aerial photography and RED-HAZE missions. The G2 Air controls the Division visual reconnaissance program which draws upon the aircraft resources of the Aviation Battalion, Division Artillery and the Armored Cavalry Squadron, as well as the aircraft assigned to the brigades. The Interrogation Section of the MI Detachment provides information extracted from human sources and captured enemy documents. The Counterintelligence Section contributes information derived from frequent liaison contacts with other intelligence agencies, participation in the Division Civic Action Program and informants.

(3) Some of the more valuable outside official sources of information have been the Central Registry Detachment (CRD), Air Force Office of Special Investigation (OSI), 149th MI Groups (JTAG), Office of the Special Assistant (OSA0), US Army CID and intelligence advisory personnel (IACV). Additionally, the US advisor to the National Police has proved to be a valuable source.

h. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action:

(1) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of action within the AO of OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

(a) Capabilities:

1. Attack a single target (multiple targets simultaneously) with up to five regiments, at times and places of his choosing, while employing local forces to cover and support his attacking elements.

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2. Defend his base areas with up to five regiments, supported by local forces elements.

3. Exfiltrate his forces into Cambodia at any time, either prior to or during friendly operations.

4. Infiltrate elements of up to regimental size, either into or through the AO, taking advantage of the natural cover and concealment afforded by terrain and periods of reduced visibility.

5. Continue harrassment, sabotage, terrorism and propaganda activities throughout the AO.

6. Stage a diversionary attack against one target for the purpose of engaging a relief force and then launch the major attack against a second target.

(b) Vulnerabilities:

1. The enemy relies on long and intricate infiltration routes and the local populace for resupply and reinforcements. The relatively sparse population in areas contiguous to the Cambodian border in PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces creates an even greater dependence on the infiltration of supplies. These routes, in turn, are vulnerable to interdiction.

2. During sustained operations, the enemy experiences shortages of rice, salt, medicines and ammunition. The diversity of weapons, particularly in VC units, complicates the resupply of ammunition.

3. Battle losses sustained by the "Lo Loi" Division have affected the morale of enemy troops. The extent to which indoctrination can strengthen morale cannot be adequately assessed; therefore, this is a questionable vulnerability.

4. A high incidence of malaria further reduces the combat effectiveness of enemy units.

5. The enemy has displayed a lack of tactical flexibility, on occasion, which has resulted in his defeat.

(c) Probable Courses of Action:

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1. Attack our committed units with larger than battalion-sized forces north of the SE SAN River and initiate attacks against lucrative targets outside the AO supported by VC units.
2. Pursue course of action 1 while simultaneously attacking Special Forces Camps, District Headquarters and Regional Forces/Popular Forces units with VC and NVA forces not yet located.
3. Pursue either or both of the above courses of action while simultaneously employing VC forces to attack US installations and interdict lines of communication.
4. Fight a delaying action while attempting to exfiltrate his forces and materiel.

(2) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action within the AO of OPERATION ADAMS:

(a) Capabilities:

1. Attack a single target (multiple targets simultaneously) with up to two regiments, supported by an artillery battalion and reinforced by Main Force and Local Force units.
2. Defend his base areas with up to two regiments, Main Force, Local Force and militia units.
3. Withdraw into base areas and avoid contact.
4. Reinforce with elements from the 610th NVA Division in BINH DINH and with Main Force and Local Force units from KHANH HOA and PHU BON Provinces.
5. Continue to conduct guerilla operations in government controlled or contested areas.

(b) Vulnerabilities:

1. Limited anti-aircraft weapons.
2. Reliance on infiltration routes and the local population for resupply and reinforcement poses a serious problem. Although the local population may be sympathetic to the VC, continued surveillance minimizes the support that can be rendered.

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3. The tactical inflexibility displayed by the enemy, on occasion, has resulted in his defeat.

4. Limited heavy weapons' firepower for conventional engagements.

(c) Probable Courses of Action:

1. Continue to conduct guerrilla activities, harassing vulnerable units and installations, interdiction lines of communication, conducting propaganda lectures and infiltrating supplies and reinforcements.

2. Prepare for future engagements by gathering intelligence, conducting reconnaissance of target areas, probing defenses, repositioning supplies and establishing forward base areas.

3. Avoid major contact with friendly forces while simultaneously trying to gain control over the rice harvest.

4. If unable to secure a sufficient amount of rice by small-unit tactics, then launch a multi-battalion attack, perhaps at several targets simultaneously, so as to minimize vulnerabilities and enhance probability for success.

i. Recommended New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization:

(1) During the reporting period, the G2 Section and the MI Detachment were not adequately staffed to function effectively and satisfy intelligence requirements imposed by brigades deployed in widely separated AOs. The problems were compounded by the complexity of intelligence channels accommodating the combined-forces organization in RVN.

(2) A G2 Section supporting widely separated brigades should be augmented to meet increased liaison requirements and to sustain 24 hour operations in TOCs. Additional clerical personnel are required to keep pace with increased administrative requirements and the MI Detachment requires an augmentation of intelligence specialist teams to be attached to the brigades.

j. Comparison of Intelligence Estimates Versus Actual Enemy Found:

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(1) OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV: The initial intelligence estimate portrayed the 1st NVA Division ("Le Loi") in the AO with the 24th NVA Regiment. An addendum was published locating the 32d, 33d and 95B NVA Regiments. As of 31 October no other enemy units were confirmed in the area. In retrospect, two of the four regiments, either organic to or closely associated with the 1st NVA Division, have been contacted. The location of the 66th and 83th NVA Regiments remains unknown. The confrontation with the 95B NVA Regiment was not predicted. Other predictions have proven accurate.

(2) OPERATION ADAMS: The intelligence estimate concluded that major contacts with friendly forces would be avoided, while reliance would be placed on a continuation of guerrilla activities. This has been verified by contacts with small, unidentified VC units. The enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable courses of action remain as indicated in the estimate. No new enemy units have been identified.

k. Weather Effects on Operations:

(1) For the purpose of this report, the effects of weather will be considered for three separate operations: OPERATION DRAGON MOUNTAIN, OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV, AND OPERATION ADAMS.

(a) OPERATION DRAGON MOUNTAIN involved movement to and development of a base camp for the 2d Brigade and Division Main. The operation was conducted in the latter third of the Southwest Monsoon. Ground movement was limited to bituminous roads. Wheel and track vehicle movement in the base camp was frequently impossible and air transportation was limited as late as 1100 hours by general fog. This condition persisted during the critical phases of base camp development and deployment of Division Main, when transportation of equipment and personnel were urgent requirements.

(b) OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV commenced toward the end of the Southwest Monsoon. Except for isolated periods when rain temporarily denied the use of land lines of communication, weather had no significant effect on the operation. Ground fog in the AO normally burned off by 0800. Occasionally, northeasterly winds, gusting to thirty knots, increased the hazards of helicopter flight and air travel times.

(c) OPERATION ADAMS commenced near the beginning of the Northeast Monsoon. Heavy rains periodically interfered with heliborne and close air support missions.

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(2) In future planning for deployment of units to RVN, unless otherwise dictated by the tactical situation, in-country arrival should coincide with the dry season. Costly delays and damage to equipment resulted from deploying to Dragon Mountain Base Camp during the monsoon season.

3. (C) Operations and training activities

a. Plans.

(1) Advance Planning.

(a) The Division advance planning group and the 4th Engineer Battalion advance party departed McChord AFB, Washington, by C-130 on 9 July and arrived NHA TRANG on 11 July. The group consisted of 25 personnel representing each of the General Staff (excluding G5), DISCOM, Aviation Battalion, Medical Battalion, Adjutant General and Signal Battalion.

(b) The following were shortfall areas and should be considered in future planning:

1 The G5, PIO and Headquarters Commandant should have representatives with advance planning groups.

2 Insufficient quantities of tentage, mess equipment, ground transportation and communications equipment accompanied the advance planning group, resulting in marginal operations prior to the arrival of the Division advance party.

3 Map boards, drafting supplies, and office expendables in sufficient quantity did not accompany the advance planning group nor were they available in-country. A sixty day stockage of expendables is a realistic planning guide for future operations.

4 Press packets containing synopses of unit histories and biographical sketches of commanders are required to be released (in forty copies) to the press upon arrival of main bodies. These packets should accompany the advance planning group.

5 A knowledge of unit departure dates, task organization, mode of transportation, expected dates of arrival and personnel and equipment manifests is required of the advance planning group. Procedures must insure that changes are furnished expeditiously. Future plans should provide for additional communications and liaison.

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6 Air transportation should be allocated on a mission basis to advance planning groups and advance parties. Valuable time was lost securing air transportation on a space-available basis.

(2) Operational Planning. Based on mission assignment, broad guidance and the assumption that the Division will continue to conduct combat operations throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone, plans were developed to:

(a) Keep portions of Highways 1, 6B and C, 7B, 14, 19, and 509 open (OPLAN ROADRUNNER).

(b) Reinforce USMC CIDG camps, RF/PT installations and critical signal sites when under attack (OPLAN ROOSEVELT AND OPLAN AVENGER).

(c) Provide security for engineer work parties and to protect the rice harvest in the TUY HOA area (OPLAN ADAMS).

(d) Conduct search and destroy operations west of Highway 14 to the Cambodian border (OPLAN PAUL REVERE IV).

(e) Assist the GVN to re-establish support of the population through revolutionary development (OPLAN FAMOUS FRIEND).

b. Operations.

(1) 1st Brigade Operations.

(a) During the reporting period, the major effort was preparation and oversea movement, organization and construction of base camp facilities and final preparations for tactical operations.

(b) The 1st Brigade deployed the advance party by air during the period 5 - 12 September. The main body embarked on the USNS Walker on 16 September and debarked at NHA TRANG on 5 October. On 6 October the Brigade closed into its TUY HOA Base Camp.

(c) At the end of the reporting period, the 1st Brigade had been operational for two weeks. On 13 October, during OPERATION SEWARD, it assumed responsibility for the security of engineer work parties in the VUNG RO Bay area and the protection of the rice harvest in the TU BONG area, relieving the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. The operation terminated in VUNG RO Bay on 20 October and in the TU BONG area on 22 October.

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(d) On 23 October the 1st Brigade began movement to its assigned AO to commence OPERATION ADAMS (Inclosure 1).

(e) 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry; and 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations employing reconnaissance patrols and establishing ambush sites.

(f) On 27 October, B Company, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry moved to block the escape of a ninety man VC force reported at CQ089477 (Inclosure 1, Arrow 1). This was a combined operation employing a six platoon Popular Force (PF) maneuver element to drive the enemy against the blocking position. Negative results were achieved.

(g) On 28 October, the Reconnaissance Platoon received fire at CQ092504, resulting in 3 US WIA and 2 PF WIA (Inclosure 1, Arrow 2). The platoon was reinforced by a rifle platoon helilifted from A Company, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry. B Company, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was helilifted into blocking positions surrounding the area. A search uncovered approximately 4800 pounds of rice.

(2) 2d Brigade Operations.

(a) The 2d Brigade advance party arrived by air at PLEIKU during the period 16 - 21 July and moved to a temporary base, vicinity 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the sponsoring unit.

(b) On 29 July, the 2d Brigade advance party closed into its base camp at Dragon Mountain.

(c) The 2d Brigade main body embarked from Tacoma, Washington, in two increments: on 21 July aboard the USNS Walker and 23 July aboard the USNS Pope. The main body debarked at QUI NHON on 6 and 10 August and was airlifted to PLEIKU. The main body closed into base camp on 10 August.

(d) The period 29 July to 27 August was devoted to establishing the base camp, receiving equipment and conducting in-country training. A total of 123 bunkers were constructed at forty meter intervals around the base camp perimeter. During hours of darkness, each bunker was manned by three personnel; during daylight hours every third bunker had one guard. Five hundred meters in front of the bunker line, six rows of barrier wire were installed. The bunker and wire complex was reinforced by ground surveillance radar, listening posts, tanks and artillery defensive concentrations. Defenses were improved with mines, fougasses, illumination and active patrolling.

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(e) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry were combat ready on 23 and 25 August, respectively. The 2d Brigade was combat ready on 27 August.

(f) 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and C Battery, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery were airlifted to TUY HOA on 27 August. Under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the Battalion was committed in OPERATION JOHN PAUL JONES and later, in the VUNG RO Bry./Pass area. The Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned AO during the period 31 August to 2 September.

1. On 3 September, a patrol from C Company received fire from an estimated platoon of VC, vicinity CQ184333 (Inclosure 1, Arrow 3). Friendly losses were 2 KIA and 2 WIA. Enemy losses in this engagement were not determined. OPERATION JOHN PAUL JONES terminated on 5 September.

2. OPERATION SEWARD was initiated on 5 September to protect the rice harvest in the TUY HOA area. During a search and destroy operation 7 September, B Company discovered 400 rounds of small arms ammunition, vicinity CQ225266 (Inclosure 1, Arrow 4).

3. On 8 September, the 1st Platoon, A Company and the Reconnaissance Platoon, while providing security for C Battery, received small arms fire. There were no friendly casualties and no confirmed enemy casualties.

4. On 10 September, the Battalion Forward Air Controller was killed when his plane was shot down by enemy fire.

5. On 14 September, C Company killed one VC. Two weapons and miscellaneous equipment were CIA.

6. Saturation patrolling continued until 27 September, when C Company began a search and destroy operation under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry (Airborne). The company received automatic weapons and 57mm recoilless rifle fire from an estimated platoon. Tactical air and artillery suppressed all but sniper fire, which continued throughout the day. Friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 12 WIA. Enemy losses were not confirmed. This operation continued until 2 October with no further contact.

7. During the period 1-13 October, A and B Companies conducted a search and destroy operation in the TUY HOA Mountains. On 3 October, B Company called in artillery on a VC force out of small arms range. VC casualties were 3 KIA.

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8 On 13 October, the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry in OPERATION SEWARD. On 14 October, the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was airlifted from TUY HOI to PLEIKU and returned to Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

(g) 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, was committed in OPERATION PAUL REVERE III on 29 August.

1 On 5 September, during search and destroy operations, huts containing one NVA pack, miscellaneous documents and grain were destroyed.

2 On 6 September, B Company found 100 punji stakes and two whip-type bamboo booby traps, vicinity ZA056200. A listening post, vicinity ZA055140, observed two individuals approaching and took them under fire. The fire was returned with negative results as the individuals withdrew.

3 On 7 September, A Company searched south along the IA MUIR River and located a burned out village, vicinity ZA046128.

4 The Battalion continued search and destroy operations during the period 8-15 September, with light enemy contact. On 13 September, B Company killed one NVA. On 16 September, the Battalion was airlifted to Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

(h) 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, conducted an air assault to replace 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry in OPERATION PAUL REVERE III on 16 September. From 16 to 28 September, the Battalion conducted search and destroy operations with no significant contact.

(i) During the period 22-26 September, the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry formed Task Force Alpha. This task force escorted B Company, 20th Engineer Battalion from BAN BLECH to CHEO REO over Highways 14 and 7B.

(j) Advance elements of the 2d Brigade deployed to a forward command post, vicinity ZL112275, on 25 September and on 27 September the remainder of the Brigade Headquarters closed.

(k) During the period 27 September - 18 October, the 2d Brigade participated in OPERATION PAUL REVERE III, under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division. The 2d Brigade Task Force consisted of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry; and the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery. The Task Force conducted blocking, surveillance, ambush, and search and destroy operations.

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Operation participation through 18 October 1966:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAYS</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>
Hq 3d Brigade	21	PAUL REVERE III
2/8 Inf	39	PAUL REVERE III
1/12 Inf	33	PAUL REVERE III
1/22 Inf	7	JOHN PAUL JONES
1/22 Inf	39	SEWARD
1/22 Inf	4	PAUL REVERE III

(3) 4th Infantry Division (-). Effective 18 October, operational control authority passed from 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division to the 4th Infantry Division and OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV was initiated. 4th Infantry Division assumed operational control of the following units:

3d Bde Task Force, 25th Inf Div
2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
6/14 Arty
3/6 Arty
A/1/30 Arty
Det 237th Arty (RADAR)
Plat (-)/B/29 Arty (SLT)
1/69 Arm: Atch 4th Inf Div

(a) 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry (minus B Company) assumed the mission of highway security along Highway 509. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was located at ZA081223 and the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry was located at YA925237. The 2d Brigade was assigned an AO and moved its tactical command post to PLEI DOCHI (YA862455) on 22 October.

(b) On 18 October, the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division command post was moved from CATECKA to its base camp, vicinity AR794525. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry remained at CATECKA. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry continued search and destroy operations, vicinity YA 871455. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry continued search and destroy operations, vicinity ZA100400. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (-) returned to 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Division Base Camp.

(c) 4th Infantry Division continued operations in the PAUL REVERE IV AO on 19 and 20 October. Light contact by 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry resulted in 2 NVN KIA, vicinity YA920520. Miscellaneous items of equipment were CIA.

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(d) 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division closed into a command post, vicinity YA866465, on 21 October. Light contact was made by 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, vicinity YA924521, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and capture of two AK-47 rifles and eight 82mm mortar rounds. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact, vicinity YA813600, with an estimated two platoons, resulting in 1 US KIA and two enemy radios CIA.

(e) On 22 October 2d Brigade closed into a command post, vicinity YA862455.

(f) On 23 October 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division made light contact while conducting search and destroy operations. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry and attached CIDG Company from 1st DJEMENG, made contact with approximately fifteen enemy, vicinity YA838626 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 6), resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 NVA CIA. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry made light contacts while conducting search and destroy operations at YA933559, YA928558 and YA931532, resulting in 1 US KIA and 14 WIA. Enemy losses were 16 NVA KIA and 2 CIA. Six small arms, 350 rounds of small arms ammunition, four 82mm mortar rounds and miscellaneous items of equipment were CIA. Eight huts and one bunker were destroyed. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry air assaulted north of the SE SAN River, vicinity YA752506, to conduct search and destroy operations to the northwest (Inclosure 2, Arrow 8).

(g) On 24 October, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry made contact with an unknown-sized enemy, vicinity YA923564. Results of the engagement were 5 NVA KIA and one light machine gun and miscellaneous equipment CIA. 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry air assaulted north of the SE SAN River, vicinity YA718472 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 9), to begin search and destroy operations to the northwest.

(h) On 25 October, the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with three VC, vicinity YA758538, resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 VC CIA. A platoon of C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, enroute to search a SKYSPOT target area, hit three mines, vicinity YA899409 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 11). Results were 4 US KIA, 8 WIA, two tanks damaged and one APC destroyed.

(i) On 26 October, 4th Infantry Division continued OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV with two brigades (2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division). The 1st Brigade initiated OPERATION ADAMS in the TUY HOA area with no significant contact. Details of 1st Brigade activity in OPERATION ADAMS are in paragraph 3b(1)d-g.

(j) On 27 October, A Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was attacked, vicinity YA725532 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 12), by an estimated reinforced NVA Company. The enemy used mortars, small arms and automatic

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weapons. Artillery and air responded and the enemy broke contact, withdrawing to the northwest. Artillery and air continued to block avenues of withdrawal. US losses were 3 KIA and one M1C-25 radio CIA. Enemy losses were 21 KIA and 3 CIA.

(k) On 28 October, C Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was attacked by an estimated NVA company, vicinity YA770594. A "dust off" helicopter (USAF Huskie) was shot down while evacuating casualties. US losses were 5 KIA and 8 WIA. Confirmed enemy losses were 7 NVA KIA and 1 NVA CIA. The Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and a CIDG Company from PLEI DJERENG Special Forces Camp discovered an ammunition cache, vicinity YA825625, containing 53 82mm mortar rounds (Inclosure 2, Arrow 14). 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, continuing search and destroy operations, made contact resulting in 7 NVA KIA.

(l) On 29 October, the 4th Infantry Division continued operations in the PAUL REVERE IV AO with heavy contact by the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, one of four battalions employed in the mountains west of PLEI DJERENG. Two additional battalions continued security and patrolling operations in the area between DUC CO and PLEI DJERENG.

1 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received two separate attacks against company perimeters: B Company by an estimated battalion and C Company by an estimated company. In each case the enemy concentrated on a sector of the perimeter in an attempt to penetrate.

2 B Company sustained a coordinated mortar and ground attack, vicinity YA690514, resulting in 4 US KIA and 23 WIA (Inclosure 2, Arrow 15), while C Company sustained a ground attack, vicinity YA675515, resulting in 2 US KIA and 11 WIA (Inclosure 2, Arrow 16). Both attacks came at 0230 hours and contact was broken at 1040 hours.

3 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, reinforced with a CIDG Company, made light contact, vicinity YA830627 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 14). US losses were 10 KIA, 43 WIA and one UH-1D helicopter destroyed. Enemy losses were 51 NVA KIA and 3 NVA, eleven small arms, three crew-served weapons, 99 rounds of mortar ammunition and forty rounds of rocket launcher ammunition CIA.

(m) On 30 October, the 4th Infantry Division continued operations in the PAUL REVERE IV AO with no significant contact. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was airlifted across the SE SAN River to fill the gap between the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (Inclosure 2, vicinity Arrow 17). Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, and attached CIDG Company, recovered 4 US dead from a downed helicopter, vicinity YA832602 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 14). 1st Battalion, 69th Armor assumed the mission of road security in the PAUL REVERE IV AO. The 2d

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Battalion, 5th Cav, 1st Air Cavalry Division, under the operational control of 4th Infantry Division, moved to OASIS as the Division reserve reaction force.

(n) On 31 October, the 4th Infantry Division continued OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV with four battalions west of the SE SAN River, one battalion northeast of PLEI DJERENG, and one battalion as Division reserve, with no significant contact. 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, assumed responsibility for the southern portion of PAUL REVERE IV AO, concurrently assuming operational control of 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry.

(o) US losses in OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV through 31 October were:

- 22 KIA
- 114 WIA
- 4 Tanks damaged
- 1 APC destroyed
- 1 UH-1B helicopter destroyed
- 1 UH-1D helicopter destroyed
- 1 Crew-served weapon destroyed
- 1 rifle destroyed
- 1 radio captured

(4) 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Operations

(a) During the first part of the reporting period, the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry (minus B Troop) completed predeployment training, including small arms qualification, tank gunnery and classes on mines and booby traps. The Squadron's primary concern during the month of August was preparation for oversea movement. Movement was accomplished in September. During October, the squadron moved inland, received equipment and established base camp. The first tactical mission was conducted during the period 15-30 October.

(b) Prior to leaving CONUS, A Troop was attached to the 1st Brigade; B Troop, to the 2d Brigade; and C Troop, to the 3d Brigade. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop and D Troop were under Squadron control.

(c) The Squadron was deployed in the following manner:

1 The advance party departed McChord AFB on 13 September and arrived PLEIKU 15 September.

2 D Troop (-) and aircraft departed Tacoma, Washington, 30 August and arrived CAM RANH Bay 19 September.

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2 Headquarters and Headquarters Troop and the remainder of D Troop departed Tacoma, Washington, on 8 September and arrived at QUI NHON 30 September.

(d) Personnel arriving by sea at QUI NHON were airlifted to Division base camp. The initial mission assigned was the organization and control of base camp security.

(e) On 7 October, B Troop reverted to Squadron control.

(f) Effective 15 October Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was organized and assumed responsibility for security of Highway 19, from FLEIKU east to North-South grid line BR 25 (Inclosure 2). Task Force was organized as follows:

SQUADRON CONTROL

3/6 Arty (-)
Civ Act Psyops Tm
4/33 Inf (Sct Dog) (-)

TEAM ULIMAN

A/1/69 Arm (-)
3/C/3/4 Cav

TEAM PORTER

B/1/10 Cav (-)
2/B/1/10 Cav
2/B/1/22 Inf
3/A/1/69 Arm
4/33 Inf (Sct Dog)

TEAM FIACCO

B/1/22 Inf (-)
4/33 Inf (Sct Dog)

(g) Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry continued its mission of road security on Highway 19 with no significant contact. On 19 October, small arms fire was received, vicinity BR155523 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 1). A tank and APC returned fire at two or three individuals in khaki uniform. A sweep of the area revealed an enemy ambush position at BR155517 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 2).

(h) On 22 October, one man was wounded by an anti-personnel mine, vicinity BR123545 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 3), and an Aero Scout received small arms fire from vicinity BR059389 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 4). A search of the area resulted in 1 VC CIA (female) and the discovery of two tunnel systems.

(i) The primary problem faced by Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was the lack of wheeled vehicles to escort convoys. Use of track vehicles was not feasible because of excessive mileage run-up and damage to paved highway. All available Squadron wheeled vehicles were employed for convoy escort. Had this mission continued for an extended period, additional wheeled vehicles would have been required.

(j) In addition to securing highway 19, Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry employed patrols using the Aero Rifle platoon of D Troop and mounted and dismounted patrols from all three teams. Civic action teams and medics visited several Montagnard and Vietnamese villages within the Task Force sector.

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(k) On 30 October Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was reorganized and deployed on a relief mission to PLEI ME (Inclosure 2). Task organization included B and D Troops, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry; B Company, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry; C Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor; and A Battery, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery. The Task Force moved into position prepared to relieve PLEI ME. On 31 October the Task Force was dissolved. B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was assigned a security mission, moving from vicinity PLEI ME to DUC CO and back to the Division base camp.

c. Training

(1) Organization. Planned deployment of the Division to RVN dictated personnel and equipment changes. Modified TOEs were drafted, based on liaison with in-country units and information contained in Operational Reports - - Lessons Learned. With DA approval, the Division (minus the 2d Brigade) reorganized and refitted in June and July. As of the end of the reporting period, modifications to organization and equipment continue, based on in-country experience and alteration of operational requirements. Significant alterations to date include the deletion of anti-tank weapons and the addition of long range communications equipment and helicopter door gunners.

(2) Preparation for oversea movement.

(a) In November 1965, the Division was alerted to prepare a brigade task force for deployment to RVN and in April 1966, to prepare the remainder of the Division for deployment.

(b) A program for receiving and training personnel was developed whereby personnel were trained and retained by Division units. The program was initiated in December 1965 and continued up to the units' EODs. The periods and phases of each units' training program were as shown (Inclosure 3). During basic and advanced unit training, emphasis was placed on small unit operations within the counterinsurgency/counterguerilla environment.

(3) Movement. During movement, shipboard training was continued, stressing small unit tactics, communications, security, civic action and enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.

(4) In-Country Activities. Upon arrival in-country each unit had approximately four weeks to prepare base camps, deprocess equipment and train. A forty hour replacement training program, stressing familiarization firing of individual and crew-served weapons, enemy techniques and tactics and employment of demolitions, mines and pyrotechnics, was initiated.

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d. Chemical operations.

(1) Defoliation of selected areas of the base camp perimeter was initiated on 14 October. Three barrels of defoliant have been dispensed to date, using a power spray apparatus. A spray system that can be mounted on a helicopter is being fabricated to provide a more efficient dispenser.

(2) On 12 October, field-expedient flame devices were installed. Four devices were installed in the southwest corner of the perimeter. Ultimately, four devices per control bunker will be installed. The flame fuel was prepared in an M4 Mixing Unit.

e. Psychological Warfare Operations.

(1) G5 coordinates and organizes psychological operations in the Division. In an extensive campaign to induce VC/NVA to surrender, 6 million leaflets were dropped during the reporting period. As of 31 October, 8 NVA have surrendered under the "Chieu Hoi" program. Other major efforts include informing civilian personnel of the Division's presence and urging them to stay in their hamlets during the hours of darkness in order that they not be unintentionally killed or injured by friendly fire.

(2) Problem areas are categorized as follows:

(a) There are insufficient officers. USARV recognizes this problem and has directed preparation of MTOE changes.

(b) There is an apparent lack of awareness on the part of commanders concerning the importance of psychological operations. Unit commanders have neither provided adequate personnel nor integrated psychological operations in their planning. Command action is being taken to insure appropriate emphasis be given this facet of combat operations.

(3) The support of the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment and the 5th Air Command Squadron has been outstanding.

(4) During this period, relations with GVN military and civilian agencies has been good despite several civilian death and injury accidents involving US troops. The MILGAP program and the Psychological Operations effort have created a good image of the US in this area, although effective communication with the Montagnard is restricted by a shortage of interpreters.

f. G3 Air Operations

(1) Tactical close air support was employed by the Division as follows:

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<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>MISSIONS FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FLC</u>	<u>SKYSFOT</u>	<u>SPOOKY</u>
22-31 Oct 66	108	223	49	54	5

Results of these missions were 19 KBA, 99 secondary explosions and a significant number of huts, rafts and bunkers destroyed.

(2) Close air support proved to be an effective and responsive means of providing close fire support to tactical commanders. The response time for immediate air requests varied from five minutes to one hour, the average being thirty minutes. In no instance was an immediate request disapproved due to unavailability of aircraft.

(3) Close air support operations have been conducted in accordance with Joint Air Ground Operations Systems (JAGOS).

(4) Communication has been the critical factor. The most useful communication system is the "hot line" VHF telephone from Division G3 Air to the I FFORCEV G3 Air. All preplanned requests have been submitted via this means. The USAF Direct Air Request Net (AM) is used to submit immediate requests; however, the "hot line" is frequently used.

g. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, the 4th Aviation Battalion (minus A Co) prepared for and deployed overseas to its present location.

(2) The POM Inspection of the Battalion was conducted fourteen days prior to ERD. Due to the short time interval between POM and ERD, the Battalion did not have sufficient time to adequately pack equipment. Due to an administrative restriction, personnel turbulence prior to deployment was excessive and non-deployable personnel were retained until the final phase of movement.

(3) In-country orientation of aviators, crew chiefs and gunners was initiated immediately upon arrival. Key personnel were assigned TDY with established USARV units and were checked-out in aviation operations in RVN. Experience gained through this transition to the combat environment was invaluable.

(4) An infusion program was established, thereby allowing experienced personnel to fly missions with those less experienced. This added depth to the training program and provided an additional instructor capability. Free-fire areas were used to provide training in gunnery while flying routine missions.

(5) Intelligence information was readily available from aviation

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units operating in-country. Coordination between aviation units and G2 proved effective in developing hostile-fire charts and locations of usable helicopter LZs.

(6) PAUL REVERE IV was the major operation in which this unit participated. Company B performed command and control missions, administrative liaison, resupply, night illumination, reconnaissance and armed helicopter support. Plans were updated to keep pace with the changing situation. The Battalion TOC was established adjacent to Air Field Operations to provide immediate response to priority mission requests.

(7) Experience has been gained in night illumination techniques. Flare missions have been flown in coordination with the Division Artillery. Additional support is provided by accompanying gunships.

(8) Logistical support received in-country has been adequate, with initial shipment of WABTOC material now on hand and the remainder scheduled to arrive in November.

(9) An active civil affairs program was initiated in which the Battalion Surgeon, in conjunction with the G5, conducts MEDCAF operations in outlying villages.

(10) Staff planning continues to be primarily directed to the Battalion mission or general support. Principal general support missions conducted during the period were airmobile operations, resupply, casualty evacuation and armed helicopter support. However, performance of the general support mission has been degraded by guard, KP and house-keeping requirements. Maintenance schedules have been slipped as a consequence.

4. (C) Logistics.

a. Logistical efforts during the reporting period were directed toward overseas movement and in-country support operations.

b. Deployment of the 4th Engineer Battalion (-), Division Advance Planning Group and 2d Brigade required seven cargo vessels, three troop ships and a C-130 aircraft. Five cargo vessels were loaded with unit equipment at the Port of Tacoma; the remaining two, with WABTOC at Oakland Army Terminal. The USNS Walker and USNS Pope departed Tacoma with 2d Brigade personnel and the USNS Gordon departed Oakland with Engineer and Advanced Planning Group personnel. In general, problems encountered by 1st and 3d Brigades during their movement were similar to those experienced by 2d Brigade and Division Main.

c. Preparation for Movement.

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(1) Preparation for the oversea movement was hampered by insufficient information and guidance on authorized equipment deployment levels.

(2) Authorized equipment levels fluctuated as a result of TOE and MTOE changes. Changes brought about equipment transfers from units with a later movement date to those having an impending date. Units then were required to requisition equipment lost through lateral transfer as well as that gained by TOE change.

(3) USCOMARC Forms 801-12 were initially submitted with incomplete data due to failure of units to report all equipment. Lack of continuity between individuals preparing initial and subsequent copies resulted in inaccuracies, re-instruction on preparation and a high incidence of forms being returned for correction and resubmission. Loading plans were not accurate, reflecting equipment that could not be shipped in the configuration specified.

(4) Sufficient time was not allotted to thoroughly prepare equipment for shipment. Available time, from completion of field training until ERD, averaged ten days. This resulted in the acceleration of the entire preparation process. The inability of the installation to provide adequate fork lift support was due primarily to the number of units simultaneously preparing for deployment.

(5) In many cases the requested number of COMEX containers were not provided until shortly before ERD. This delayed packing and resulted in late submission of unit feeder reports reflecting weight and cube. Since feeder reports were the basis for preparing shipping documents, a chain reaction resulted. Accurate and complete data were not provided, resulting in resubmission of documents, resulting in delay of Transportation Control Movement Documents and Transportation Control Numbers, resulting in units being unable to mark vehicles and equipment prior to "call-down" from the port, resulting in delayed preparation of ships' manifests.

d. Movement:

(1) Surface Movement of Cargo.

(a) Cargo of 4th Engineer Battalion (-), 2d Brigade, 1st Brigade, Division Main and 3d Brigade was moved in increments as shown in the following ship schedule:

<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	
				<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
Durango	2 Jul	30 Jul	CAM RANH	3026	10114
Bucknell	9 Jul	2 Aug	QUI NHON	1463	5852

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<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	
				<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
Boise	17 Jul	4 Aug	QUI NHON	1446	5784
U.S. Victory	19 Jul	5 Aug	QUI NHON	1223	4892
Adventurer	20 Jul	9 Aug	QUI NHON	1729	6904
Exton	28 Aug	22 Sep	VUNG RO	1506	6223
Pacific	29 Aug	21 Sep	VUNG RO	1549	5855
Core	30 Aug	20 Sep	QUI NHON	-	-
-	-	-	CAM RANH	380	6176
Explorer	3 Sep	19 Sep	QUI NHON	-	-
-	-	-	CAM RANH	1138	5368
S. O. Bland	2 Sep	24 Sep	QUI NHON	1420	5434
S. T. Texas	2 Sep	21 Sep	QUI NHON	3984	1514
Fair Isle	5 Sep	25 Sep	QUI NHON	2259	7990
Mankato	6 Sep	29 Sep	QUI NHON	1598	6799
Lahaina	8 Sep	30 Sep	QUI NHON	752	2813
Ridgefield	12 Sep	5 Oct	VUNG TAU	1481	6406
Brazil	13 Sep	5 Oct	VUNG TAU	2182	6658
*Beloit	16 Sep	-	-	-	-
Malden	20 Sep	10 Oct	VUNG TAU	1929	8009
Clearwater	22 Sep	16 Oct	VUNG TAU	1062	3942
Carrol	10 Oct	6 Nov(est)	QUI NHON	3	12
Earlham	14 Oct	10 Nov(est)	QUI NHON	169	695

*Beloit towed back to Port of Seattle and cargo loaded on Earlham for shipment.

(b) Clearing ports where cargo for the 1st and 3d Brigades was discharged was the responsibility of the respective Brigades. Clearing the Port of QUI NHON was the responsibility of Division Main.

(2) Surface Movement of Personnel. Embarkation was through Tacoma, Oakland and Seattle in accordance with following schedule:

<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>POD</u>
USNS Gordon	Engr Bn (-)	7 Jul	30 Jul	QUI NHON
USNS Walker	2d Bde	21 Jul	12 Aug	QUI NHON
USNS Pope	2d Bde	23 Jul	14 Aug	QUI NHON
USNS Pope	Div Main	8 Sep	30 Sep	QUI NHON
USNS Gordon	1st Bde	16 Sep	5 Oct	CAM RANH
USNS Walker	3d Bde	22 Sep	13 Oct	VUNG TAU

(3) Surface Movement of WABTOC, WABTOC moved through Oakland according to the following schedule:

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<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>POD</u>
Iberville	Engr Bn (-)	15 Jul	9 Aug	NHA TRANG
John "C"	2d Bde	23 Jul	17 Aug	QUI NHON
Robin Sherwood	1st Bde	17 Sep	8 Oct	CAM RANH
Red Oak	Div Main	20 Sep	9 Oct	QUI NHON
Pendelton	3d Bde	6 Oct	10 Nov (est)	QUI NHON

(4) Air Movement of Personnel and Cargo.

(a) Selected personnel and cargo were airlifted in five increments. The original plan was to airlift the advance party, command group, and rear detachment. An augmentation of airlift was required to move signal personnel and the rear detachment overflow.

(b) 1st Increment.

<u>PAM NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
387	Adv Flanning Gp Engr Adv Pty	9 Jul	13 Jul	CL30	NHA TRANG	44	8 Tons

(c) 2d Increment.

<u>PAM NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
219	2d Bde	13 Jul	17 Jul	CL33	NHA TRANG	6	22 Tons
220	2d Bde	14 Jul	16 Jul	CL41	NHA TRANG	96	-
221	2d Bde	15 Jul	19 Jul	CL33	NHA TRANG	6	20 Tons
222	2d Bde	16 Jul	20 Jul	CL33	NHA TRANG	6	20 Tons
223	2d Bde	17 Jul	21 Jul	CL30	NHA TRANG	60	-
224	2d Bde	19 Jul	21 Jul	CL41	NHA TRANG	96	-

(d) 3d Increment.

<u>PAM NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
1315	Sig Bn (-)	2 Sep	4 Sep	CL41	PLEIKU	88	-
1371	Sig Bn (-)	2 Sep	4 Sep	CL41	PLEIKU	88	-
1316	Sig Bn (-)	3 Sep	6 Sep	CL30	PLEIKU	-	10 Tons
1339	1st Bde	5 Sep	7 Sep	CL41	NHA TRANG	88	-
1340	1st Bde	6 Sep	10 Sep	CL24	NHA TRANG	-	10 Tons
1341	Command Gp	6 Sep	8 Sep	CL41	PLEIKU	80	-
1342	Div Main	7 Sep	10 Sep	CL24	PLEIKU	-	9 Tons

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<u>PAM</u> <u>NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
1343	1st Bde	7 Sep	12 Sep	C124	NHA TRANG	-	12 Tons
1344	1st Bde	7 Sep	9 Sep	C141	NHA TRANG	88	-
1345	1st Bde	8 Sep	10 Sep	C141	NHA TRANG	88	-
1346	Div Main	9 Sep	11 Sep	C141	PLEIKU	85	-
1347	Div Main	10 Sep	12 Sep	C141	PLEIKU	90	-
1348	Div Main	11 Sep	15 Sep	C133	PLEIKU	-	30 Tons
1349	Div Main	11 Sep	13 Sep	C144	PLEIKU	90	-
1350	Div Main	12 Sep	14 Sep	C144	PLEIKU	90	-
1351	Div Main	13 Sep	16 Sep	C133	PLEIKU	-	13 Tons
1352	Div Main	13 Sep	15 Sep	C141	PLEIKU	88	-
1353	Div Main	14 Sep	16 Sep	C141	PLEIKU	88	-

(e) 4th Increment.

<u>PAM</u> <u>NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
1354	3d Bde	16 Sep	21 Sep	C124	BIEN HOA	3	10 Tons
1355	3d Bde	17 Sep	21 Sep	C124	BIEN HOA	-	10 Tons
1356	3d Bde	17 Sep	19 Sep	C130	BIEN HOA	37	4 Tons
1357	Div Main	17 Sep	21 Sep	C133	BIEN HOA	-	30 Tons
1358	3d Bde	23 Sep	25 Sep	C141	BIEN HOA	90	-
1359	3d Bde	24 Sep	26 Sep	C141	BIEN HOA	90	-
1360	3d Bde	25 Sep	27 Sep	C141	BIEN HOA	90	-
1361	Div Main	20 Sep	22 Sep	C141	PLEIKU	90	-

(f) 5th Increment.

<u>PAM</u> <u>NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
1936	1st Bde Rear	1 Oct	4 Oct	C130	PLEIKU	60	-
1937	1st Bde Rear	30 Sep	3 Oct	C130	CAM RANH	8	4 Tons

(g) 6th Increment.

<u>PAM</u> <u>NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
207	3d Bde Rear	5 Oct	7 Oct	C141	TAN SON NHUT	37	10 Tons

(h) 7th Increment.

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>POD</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
8	Div Rear	7 Oct	9 Oct	C141	PLEIKU	90	-
9	Div Rear	6 Oct	9 Oct	C124	PLEIAU	-	8 Tons

e. In-country Activities.

(1) No significant problems in logistical support activities have been encountered in-country. Minor problem areas are:

(a) Inability to provide one day "turn-around" service has influenced Sub-Area Command's ability to resupply.

(b) Lack of coordination between transportation representatives and units furnishing convoy security resulted in transportation delay and inadequate security.

(c) Procedures for processing combat emergency resupply missions were not concise and channels of communication were not clearly defined. Principals involved were the Forward Supply Area Task Force Commander (FSA), the Brigade and Division Airlift Officers, the Sub-Area Command Operations Officer, the Division Transportation Officer (DTO), and the Division and I FFORCEV G4s. The problem is under study. Two combat emergency resupply missions were flown during the reporting period: 20,000 gallons of JP-4 to DUC CO and 12,000 gallons of JP-4 to PLEI DJERENG. Both missions were accomplished successfully.

(2) Support for tactical operations was furnished through FSAs established by PLEIKU Sub-Area Command. In addition, Class II & IV supply was furnished through the DISCOM from base camp. OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV was initially supported with FSAs located at OASIS (Zal20286) and PLEI DOCHI (YAB66455), southwest and west of PLEIKU, respectively. Resupply of the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was accomplished from the FSA at OASIS while resupply of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was initially accomplished from PLEI DOCHI. The FSA at OASIS was later moved to PLEI DJERENG (YAB59534) and currently (maintaining a three day supply of Class I, III, IIIA and V) supports both brigades.

(3) 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, in OPERATION ADAMS, did not have an FSA in direct support. Support was furnished through a Forward Support Element (FSE). A proposal to support the 1st Brigade with an FSA is under study.

(4) Support of Division Main and 2d Brigade was provided by GVI NHON Support Command and PLEIKU Sub-Area Command. Minimum support for Class II and IV was available through PLEIKU Sub-Area Command, however,

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the bulk of these supplies was obtained through QUI NHON Support Command by normal requisition.

(5) Direct exchange and self-service supply were provided by PLEIKU Sub-Area Command. DISCOM plans to organize a direct exchange and self-service supply facility at Division base camp.

(6) 1st Brigade was supported by TUY HQ Sub-Area Command and C.M RANH Support Command. Back-up support for Class I and III was provided by TUY HQ Sub-Area Command. The S&T Battalion provided ration breakdown and POL support to base camp and forward elements. Class II and IV support was provided by C.M RANH Support Command.

(7) Roads in Dragon Mountain Base Camp and surrounding area were so muddy just prior to the arrival of the main body that base camp development was delayed. A major effort by all units was required to move equipment from QUI NHON to base camp.

(8) Periodic Logistics Report implementing instructions were published on 7 October. Coordination with all units by G4 resulted in feeder reports to DISCOM for review and consolidation prior to submission to G4.

(9) Division Transportation Office (DTO).

(a) The DTO, initially under G4 control, became operational in-country with two personnel on 12 September and reverted to DISCOM control on 17 October. During the reporting period the DTO primarily supervised convoy operations between QUI NHON and base camp. Initially, a backlog of equipment at QUI NHON required a port detail of approximately 120 personnel to provide security for and coordinate movement of equipment arriving from CONUS. The backlog was reduced as Division vehicles were off-loaded and organized into convoys. An average convoy contained 55 vehicles and required two days to make the trip QUI NHON - PLEIKU - QUI NHON. This operation has been completed except for cargo requiring in-country transshipment due to stationing plan changes.

(b) Logistical transportation support between PLEIKU and QUI NHON was not available in time to support the Division. There were no area transportation offices to coordinate movement of replacements, rotatees and baggage. Vehicle support was willingly provided from uncommitted area assets. However, due to priority combat resupply missions, the amount of truck transportation available was insufficient. Division was forced to use organic transportation capabilities, detracting from assigned missions and wearing out vehicles not built for long-haul operations. Movement of W&BTOC has required approximately 520 "turn-around" trips for 2½ ton trucks. As of 31 October, the haul has not been completed.

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(c) The DTO processed three major in-country airlift unit moves and 34 special mission requests during the reporting period. In-country airlift support has been superior.

(d) On 18 October, the Division was committed to OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV, thus increasing the combat support requirements. The DTO, augmented with personnel and vehicles from DISCOM, coordinated convoys to forward areas on a one day "turn-around" schedule. Priority was given to transporting general cargo, Red TAT and WABTOC from QUI NHON to base camp.

(e) The DTO requested an MTOE augmentation of personnel and equipment.

(10) Medical.

(a) POM processing was accomplished with no significant problems. Immunization teams of ten to fourteen corpsmen and one doctor were made available at the processing center to screen records, administer immunizations and construct temporary health records when necessary. Ample vaccines were made available by Madigan General Hospital.

(b) In August and September, troop dispensaries were put under Fort Lewis control. By phasing, care was continuous and units were able to resupply and pack.

(c) During oversea movement, the health of the command remained excellent. Although each vessel had assigned medical personnel and facilities, the Division's resources were deployed to augment. By employing organic medical personnel in this way the units controlled medical records and stayed in touch with the health of the command. The health of the command remains excellent.

(d) The Division has not experienced a significant run on any disease peculiar to the AO.

5. (U) Civil Affairs.

a. The G5 section started deployment planning with the arrival of LTC Brain on 10 June. Effort was directed to expand G5 activities to meet problems soon to be encountered in RVN.

b. Problems encountered in the expansion were similar to those normal to the activation of a new unit: preparation of SOPs, coordination with staff agencies and development of command interest. The problems were intensified by a lack of experienced personnel.

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c. A new SOP was written and guidance on civil affairs activities was disseminated throughout the command. A Civil Affairs Conference, attended by S5s of all battalion-sized units, was conducted 8-9 August. Following this, activity was directed toward administrative and logistical planning for deployment.

d. Operations In-country

(1) The G5 arrived at PLEIKU on 29 August. Immediate problems were associated with Indigenous labor. Meetings were arranged with US Advisors, USAID, and Province Officials to determine labor resources. Items of concern included requests by local nationals to set up bars and shops, use of National Police to screen laborers and pass policy. From 29 August to 12 September, activity involved coordination with GVN civil and military officials, US military officials and members of the Country Team (JUSPAC and USAID). Vital information and guidance was obtained from these sources. Of special interest was the visit to the 1st Air Cavalry Division on 5 September, during which arrangements were made for the attachment of a Civic Action Team from the division. Their experiences regarding pass policy, labor SOP, civic action and MEDCAP plans materially assisted planning.

(2) By 13 September, all members of the Section had arrived, however equipment did not arrive until 15 October. The lack of equipment (particularly vehicles) and inadequate office space, seriously limited initial operations.

(3) Activity was concentrated on small scale, high impact, short duration projects. Chief among these was the Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP). A total of 4,000 individuals were treated for illnesses ranging from the common cold to tuberculosis. Photos of MEDCAP activities are attached (Inclosure 4). Medical Officers reported that one of the reasons for illness among the Montagnards was their lack of knowledge in personal hygiene. To remedy this situation, soap was obtained from USAID and personal hygiene classes became an integral part of MEDCAP operations. During the period, 16,000 were helped under the Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP).

(4) In an effort to exploit the experience of local forces, G5 initiated a series of "FAMOUS FRIEND" operations, the first of which was conducted on 1 October. These operations were conducted in three phases:

(a) Cordon off a Hamlet: US or local forces move in before dawn to seal off the hamlet. Anyone attempting to leave is detained.

(b) Search and Screen: Local forces, with GVN District

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Officials, search the hamlet, conduct interrogation and inform the people of GVN and US goals in the area.

(c) MEDCAP and other Civic Actions: Sick call is conducted and surveys are made in the hamlet to determine the type support needed. As of 31 October, two such operations have been conducted at Division level and subordinate units have conducted 26. While these have not produced significant intelligence information, they have been instrumental in establishing good relations with the people and have provided the impetus for closer coordination between US and GVN forces. The after action report of OPERATION FAMOUS FRIEND I is attached (Inclosure 5).

(5) Other MILCAP operations during this period include the distribution of USAID material and sustenance supplies to local hamlets, road improvement, improvement of water supplies, conduct of English classes and the hire of 24,000 local laborers.

e. On 1 October, a team of three officers and three enlisted men from the 41st Civil Affairs Company, NHA TRANG, was attached to Division. Their primary function was to coordinate civic action activities and continue projects that units could not complete as a result of other missions. The team was frequently attached to units on a mission basis.

f. Labor hire posed a significant problem. Although civilian labor is a GI staff responsibility, G5 suffered from association. The main problem resulted from the desire to increase the daily labor force from 400 to 1000. The required number of laborers was provided through coordination with local officials. Subsequently, transportation, supervision and security problems resulted in a substantial reduction of the labor force.

g. A background paper on the ethnic, social and political characteristics of the Montagnard is attached (Inclosure 6).

6. (C) Personnel.

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Beginning of Reporting Period (1 Aug 66)	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized	994	143	4341	5478
Assigned	254	17	4453	4724

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(2) Close of Reporting Period (31 Oct 66)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
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Authorized	994	143	4341	5478
Assigned	982	115	4773	5870

b. Replacements. A total of 124 officers and 916 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period, losses were 37 officers and 1239 enlisted men. Forty emergency leaves were processed during the period.

c. Morale and Personnel Services.

(1) Morale throughout the Division and attached units is excellent.

(2) Decorations and Awards:

Bronze Star (Valor)	2
Bronze Star (Achievement)	6
Army Commendation (Valor)	3
Army Commendation Medal (Achievement)	10
Purple Heart	<u>15</u>
TOTAL	36

(3) Combat Badges:

Combat Infantry Badge	848
Combat Medical Badge	23
Aircraft Crewman Badge	<u>3</u>
	874

d. Promotions. A total of 4047 enlisted promotions were made during the period.

e. Reenlistments. Eighty-one reenlistments or extensions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was: Career RA reenlistments (61), first term RA reenlistments (2), AUS reenlistments (0), RA extensions (18), and AUS extension (0). Career Counselors continue to visit units at base camp and in the AO.

f. Postal.

(1) Money Order Sales	\$1,185,989.46
(2) Postal and Parcel Post Fees	\$ 10,819.00

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(3) Incoming Mail (Daily Average)	2,788 lbs	(40 lbs)
(4) Outgoing Mail (Daily Average)	1,358 lbs	(19 lbs)
(5) Number of incoming mail days	69	
(6) Number of outgoing mail days	72	

g. Special Services. During the reporting period a total of 56 movies and TV films were circulated throughout the Division. Three USO shows played to an estimated attendance of 3,500. There were 363 out-of-country and 80 in-country R & R quotas filled.

h. Chaplain Activities.

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Catholic	235	10,558
Protestant	184	9,916
Jewish	2	47
Memorial	2	212

i. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) Discipline: A total of 94 incidents were reported during the period.

(2) Military Justice:

General Courts Martial	1
Special Courts Martial	20
Summary Courts Martial	24

7. (C) Artillery.

a. General.

(1) During the reporting period the Division Artillery and the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) participated in the following:

(a) Preparation for and movement to RVN by sea and air.

(b) Occupation and development of the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery and 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery base camp areas.

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(c) Base camp defense.

(d) OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

(2) The 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery plus A Battery, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery; the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery were attached to the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades respectively, for movement to and operation within RVN. This attachment continues.

b. Intelligence.

(1) The basic load of maps was issued during preparation for movement to RVN. Upon arrival in-country it was found that the issued map series was obsolete. At present, the old series is still in use, pending issue of the new.

(2) The S2 was a member of the Division advance party. This proved beneficial in that sources of artillery intelligence were contacted and liaison was established prior to the arrival of the main body. The sources were II Corps Headquarters, PLEIKU Sector and US Special Forces.

(3) The section has been actively engaged in developing artillery intelligence and in base camp defense. Initially, the S2 was designated Sector Coordinator for Sector West of the base camp defense. The Commanding Officer, Division Artillery, was given the responsibility for base camp defense on 17 October and the S2 became the Base Camp Defense Coordinator.

(4) The nine authorized air observers are under the supervision of the S2. Observers are used for visual reconnaissance, artillery adjustment and "road-runner" operations.

(5) The Survey Section has surveyed the base camp (to include position area survey for artillery and mortars) and is preparing to extend survey control to forward operational areas. Lack of distance measuring equipment, which has not arrived in-country, has limited the ability to conduct 4th order survey.

(6) The Radar Section has the mission of target acquisition for base camp. Since 6 October, the AN/TPS-25 surveillance radar has been employed during hours of darkness and has proved invaluable in detecting personnel and vehicle movement outside the perimeter. A major problem area has been the lack of repair parts. The radar has been deadlined since 24 October and as of the end of the reporting period the required parts have not been received.

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(7) On 1 October, Division Artillery assumed operational control of the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery's AN/MPQ-4 countermortar radar and is employing it in base camp.

(8) The Metro Section was attached to the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery to provide metro support for the TUY HOA area. The 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, 52d Artillery Group was directed to provide metro support for the PLEI DJERENG area of OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

c. Plans. Since arrival in-country, Division Artillery has completed fire planning for the following operations:

- (1) PAUL REVERE IV
- (2) OPLAN ROOSEVELT
- (3) OPLAN AVENGER
- (4) OPLAN TRAVIS
- (5) Base Camp Defense

d. Operations. The Division Artillery Commander was designated commander of the Division (-) Air Advance Party and Division Artillery, movement coordinator. A Division Artillery Coordination Center was established and unit project officers designated. A series of bulletins were published by the Coordination Center covering all aspects of the move. During the movement phase, a liaison officer was co-located with the Air Traffic Control Officer and Airlift Officer at McChord AFB. This officer coordinated directly with the Air Force and solved many problems before they reached critical proportions. Problem areas encountered in the move included delays in the receipt of shipping documents and breakdowns in coordination brought about by the turn-over of unit project officers.

(1) The Division Artillery air advance party departed on 9 September and arrived in-country 11 September. During the period 11 September until arrival of the main body on 1 October, the following was accomplished:

- (a) The Division Artillery base camp area was established.
- (b) Headquarters and units in the II Corps Tactical Zone were visited.
- (c) Defense plans for the base camp were prepared.

(2) The air advance party, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery, departed on 12 September and arrived on 13 September. Prior to the arrival of the main body, the following was accomplished:

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- (a) The Battalion base camp area was established.
- (b) S1 and S4 activities were established.

(3) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and D Battery, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery, arrived in base camp on 1 October. On 7 October the 8 inch howitzers of D Battery arrived in base camp. On 29 October, two 155mm batteries (B and C Batteries) moved from QUI NHON to tactical positions south of the SE SAN River in support of OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

(4) The Aviation Section arrived in-country on 18 September. After training at DONG BE THIN, the section moved to base camp to commence operation. Disposition of aircraft was as indicated:

(a) OH-23:

6th Battalion, 29th Artillery	2
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery	2
2d Battalion, 77th Artillery	2
Division Artillery	3

(b) UH-1B:

Division Artillery	2
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The helicopters operating from base camp were used extensively for command and control, resupply, artillery observation, visual reconnaissance, base camp defense and liaison.

(5) Tactical Employment.

(a) On 15 October, a platoon of D Battery, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery was attached to Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. Task Force mission was security and escort on Highway 19. The platoon returned to base camp on 23 October.

(b) The following artillery task organizations supported PAUL REVERE IV through 31 October:

1. 18-22 October

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
2/9 Arty: Atch
A/3/6 Arty: OCA 2/9 Arty
A/6/14 Arty: OCA 2/9 Arty
237 Radar Det: OCA 2/9 Arty

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2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
4/42 Arty: Atch
2/6/6/14 Arty: OCA 4/42 Arty
4/1/30 Arty: OCA 4/42 Arty
Plt/B/29 Arty (SLT): OCA

Task Force, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry
C/3/6 Arty: Atch
Plt/D/5/16 Arty: Atch

Division Artillery
D/5/16 Arty (-): GS
Plt/B/29 Arty (SLT): GS

2. 23-31 October

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
2/9 Arty: Atch
A/3/6 Arty: OCA 2/9 Arty
237 Radar Det: OCA 2/9 Arty

2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
4/42 Arty: Atch
A/1/30 Arty: OCA 4/42 Arty
D/5/16 Arty (-): OCA 4/42 Arty

Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry
3/6 Arty (-): DS

Division Artillery

5/16 Arty (-): GS
6/14 Arty (-): GSR 4/42 Arty

3. 18-31 October

Base Camp Artillery

D/5/16 Arty (-): (2-8" How)
D/4/42 Arty (PROV): (3-105mm How)

(6) Ammunition. From 18 October to 31 October, during OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV, 20,039 rounds of 105mm, 849 rounds of 155mm, 1,238 rounds of 8 inch and 839 rounds of 175mm ammunition were fired. Average ammunition stockage for forward fire bases was 1000-1500 rounds of 105mm, 700 rounds of 155mm, and 200 rounds per tube of 8 inch and 175mm.

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(7) Safety. Procedures established to promote safety are:

(a) Current locations of friendly forces are plotted on firing charts.

(b) When firing data corrections are not available, the first round in adjustment is fired at the following minimum distance from friendly troops:

105mm	500 meters
155mm	700 meters
8 inch/175mm	1000 meters

(c) The first round in adjustment is smoke (illumination at night) when firing is at minimum distances prescribed in (b) above.

(d) During firing, air guards are posted at firing positions to insure aircraft safety.

(e) Commanders check sling equipment and loads prior to helicopter lifts.

(8) H&I Fires. A cardinal rule is: Pick targets based on current intelligence. The effectiveness of the technique has been confirmed by enemy KIA found during sweeps through areas where H&Is have been fired. Using all detection means, an active H&I program has been developed without resorting to "historical" intelligence.

(9) Base Camp Fire Control. On 1 October, Division Artillery assumed operational control of three 105mm howitzers, three 81mm mortars and three 4.2 inch mortars in base camp. Tactical fire direction is provided by Division Artillery and technical fire direction by the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery.

e. Logistics.

(1) POM inspections were conducted from 1 through 6 August for the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery; 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery. POM inspections were conducted 17 through 22 August for the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery. POM inspections were not scheduled far enough in advance of ERD to allow for equipment repair and receipt of requisitioned replacement items.

(2) Logistical support in-country has been adequate.

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(3) Initial problems of transporting artillery ammunition to the forward areas from base camp were alleviated by the establishment of an FSA at PLEI DJERENG. The following FSA stockage levels for HE ammunition proved to be adequate for combat operations:

105mm	5000 rounds
155mm	2500 rounds
8 inch	1300 rounds
175mm	900 rounds

f. Civil Affairs. On 19 October, Division Artillery initiated a civic action program in three Montagnard villages: PLEI LE LANN, PLEI LE ANH and PLEI GYUN. The Division Artillery Sergeant Major supervised the execution of the program. MEDCAP activities were conducted by the Division Artillery Surgeon. The program relies on the village cultural structure to reach the people. All activities are coordinated with the village chief and elders.

g. Personnel. The Division Artillery deployed at 102 percent strength. This enabled the unit to maintain a C-1 personnel rating.

h. Signal.

(1) Division Artillery established the following:

(a) Internal and external wire nets.

(b) FM Nets:

1. Division Command.
2. Division Artillery Command and Fire.
3. Base Camp Defense.
4. Base Camp Fire Request.
5. PLEIKU Defense.

(c) AM Nets:

1. Division Command.
2. Division Artillery Command and Fire.

(2) The requirement for base camp defense nets imposed a demand on FM radios in excess of authorized allowance. A request was made for additional radios.

(3) Radio teletype operators continue to receive on-the-job instruction to improve their proficiency. The majority were assigned directly to school and had no practical experience.

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8. (C) Engineer.

a. On 6 July, the 4th Engineer Battalion (-) deployed by air from Seattle-Tacoma International Airport to Oakland Army Terminal, where it boarded the USNS Gordon. The Battalion (623 personnel) debarked from the USNS Gordon at QUI NHON on 30 July and was moved by C-130 to PLEIKU. Personnel were trucked to the base camp, which had been established on 28 July by the advance parties of the 2d Brigade and B Company, 4th Engineer Battalion.

b. The advance party departed McChord AFB by air on 9 July and arrived NHA TRANG on 11 July. The advance party initially moved to DONG BA THIN in anticipation of their main body arriving at CAM RANH Bay. The stationing plan was changed and the advance party moved to PLEIKU on 22 July.

c. B Company (-) (attached to the 2d Brigade) departed by air from McChord AFB on 17 July and arrived PLEIKU on 19 July. E Company and the remainder of B Company embarked from Tacoma with Division Main.

d. The Durango Victory and the Fair Isle, cargo ships with equipment for the Battalion, arrived at QUI NHON 23 and 24 July, respectively. The first convoy of fifteen vehicles departed QUI NHON and arrived PLEIKU without incident 27 July.

e. The Battalion closed at Dragon Mountain Base Camp on 30 July.

f. Battalion effort was directed toward the following projects:

- (1) Site layout for 10,000 man camp.
- (2) Installation of perimeter barriers.
- (3) Construction of defensive bunkers.
- (4) Maintenance of access roads to the camp site.
- (5) Construction of interior roads.
- (6) Construction of latrines.
- (7) Movement of equipment from QUI NHON to base camp.

g. During the month of August the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, was committed in OPERATION PAUL REVERE III. B Company supported this operation with one platoon. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was committed on OPERATION SEWARD in the vicinity of TUY HOA, B Company supported this

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operation with one platoon. The Battalion (-) continued construction of base camp facilities. By 31 August the perimeter barrier was seventy percent complete. The movement of equipment and cargo from QUI NHON continued through the month of August.

h. As rain abated, progress on construction projects improved. D Company commenced work on the Division Tactical Operation Center (DTCO). B and C Companies prefabricated "burn out" latrines and bunker frames and delivered them to unit areas where they were assembled on a "self help" basis with engineer technical assistance as required. By the end of September, all units in base camp had, as a minimum, fifty percent of the required latrines and bunker frames.

i. C Company constructed 65 helicopter parking areas and revetments. This project required approximately 1.5 million sandbags, filled and stacked by approximately 700 indigenous laborers.

j. On 14-15 September, A Company deployed from base camp to vicinity TUY HOA to build the 1st Brigade base camp. A Company was attached to the 1st Brigade on 18 September.

k. On 20 September, B Company deployed from base camp to OASIS in support of the 2d Brigade on OPERATION PAUL REVERE III.

l. On 30 September, the remainder of E Company closed into base camp. They embarked from the Port of Tacoma on 7 September aboard the USNS Walker, arrived at QUI NHON on 28 September, debarked on 30 September and were airlifted to PLEIKU by C-130 aircraft.

m. In response to a request from the 8th Engineer Battalion, 1st Air Cavalry Division for tactical bridging, elements of E Company were dispatched on 4 October to support OPERATION THAYER.

n. The Division was committed to OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV on 18 October. By the end of the period the Battalion was deployed as follows:

- (1) A Company attached to 1st Brigade, TUY HOA.
- (2) B Company - D/S to 2d Brigade on OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.
- (3) C Company - G/S base camp.
- (4) D Company - G/S base camp.
- (5) E Company - G/S base camp.
- (6) Headquarters and Headquarters Company - G/S base camp.

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c. Intelligence Activities.

(1) The Battalion initially gathered intelligence by attending daily briefings conducted by ARVN and US personnel at PLEIKU Sub-Sector Headquarters. Typewritten summaries were available.

(2) Daily and weekly intelligence summaries were available from the G2 Section, 11 Corps (ARVN). Non-availability of radio teletype equipment at battalion level dictated that summaries be picked up when possible. In most cases, the information was too old to be useful.

(3) The S2 Section, 299th Engineer Battalion was a good source of intelligence data and improved as additional elements of the Brigade arrived.

(4) The 299th Engineer Battalion also forwarded intelligence summaries from the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and 1st Air Cavalry Division. As additional Divisional units arrived, the G2 Section became the source for summaries.

p. Weather Data. On 27 August, measurement of rainfall was begun by the S2 Section. A log was maintained to keep data on number of "wet" as opposed to "dry" days. There was a significant variation between the measurements taken by the PLEIKU weather station and those taken at Dragon Mountain:

August	11.2 inches	(PLEIKU)
September	13.5 "	(Dragon Mountain)
October	3.5 "	(Dragon Mountain)

q. Reconnaissance Missions.

(1) Due to initial emphasis on base camp development and movement restrictions imposed by heavy rainfall during August and early September, reconnaissance missions were confined to the base camp and environs.

(2) On arrival of Division Headquarters, and the subsequent announcement of contingency missions, the reconnaissance teams were sent out to obtain route data. Various engineer units (the Engineer Section at I FFORCEV and the 299th Battalion) were solicited for information on routes previously reconnoitered.

(3) Daily aerial reconnaissance was made of Highway 509 to PLEI DJEKENG, the lateral route between Highway 509 and Highway 19 to DUC CO, and Highway 19 from DUC CO to Dragon Mountain. Weekly aerial reconnaissance was made of Highway 60 to PLEI ME since there are no bridges on that route. Contact was maintained with the 299th Battalion and 20th Engineer

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Battalion (Combat) to upgrade various routes within the Division area of interest.

r. Mission. The Battalion has the primary mission of supporting operations, with a secondary mission of base camp development. The Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, C and D companies and E Company (Bridge) are stationed at base camp. During most of the reporting period, B Company was providing combat support to the 2d Brigade.

s. Operations and Projects.

(1) Initial base camp development was severely hampered by rain and mud which curtailed road net development and delayed most other construction projects.

(2) Engineer Support on tactical operations consisted of road development, LZ preparation, destruction of tunnels, forward base improvement and bridging streams.

(3) From 4-16 October, one bridge section from E Company supported 1st Air Cavalry Division tactical operations involving the use of assault boats.

(4) B Company and one bridge section of E Company are presently supporting the Division in OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV. Three AVLBs and two M4T6 dry span bridges have been emplaced. Because of daily rain, considerable bulldozer effort and crushed rock were used to maintain tactical roads.

(5) All major roads in the base camp have been graded and ditched. A critical need exists for crushed rock because of rapid deterioration of the clay soil during heavy rain. Presently, the only available rock suitable for road surfacing is available in limited quantity from two quarries at PLEIKU.

(6) The perimeter barrier, consisting of eight wire obstacles with a breadth of 270 meters, was completed on 25 September. Each obstacle is about eight kilometers long. Reinforcing with additional wire obstacles is a continuing requirement which has been delegated to the units manning perimeter fortifications. A total of 200 three-man permanent bunkers are being built at forty meter intervals around the perimeter. At present, 54 permanent bunkers have been completed.

(7) There is a continuing requirement for sandbags to build bunkers and revetments. Approximately 20,000 sandbags are being filled daily using two ditching machines and 300 indigenous laborers. In the AO, both artillery and infantry units need sandbags each time a new LZ is occupied. Very few of the used sandbags are recovered when the units move.

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(8) A five-building Division Headquarters complex was ready for beneficial occupancy at the end of the reporting period. Two line companies worked on this project from 17 September through 31 October.

t. Training. On-the-job training was conducted with emphasis on efficiency, proper supervision and technical skill. On 10 September, a two hour class on LZ preparation was presented by aviation personnel. All personnel received in-country orientation. Training is continuously conducted on Claymore mines and weapons familiarization.

u. Supply.

(1) Class I. The Battalion has operated a ration breakdown point during the period. Until 8 October, rations were picked up at the HLEIKU Sub-Area Command Class I Point, broken down at the Battalion, and delivered to the unit. Starting on 8 October, rations were drawn from the Division Ration Breakdown Point. No ration breakdown personnel are provided in the MTOE. The modified B-ration, with A-ration perishables, has been the standard ration. Lack of refrigeration in the unit messes has been a problem.

(2) Class II & IV (loss construction). Prior to departure from CONUS, separate property books were established for B and E Companies. When A Company was attached to the 1st Brigade, their separate property book was also established. The advance party acquired tropical fatigues and boots, and these items were issued to personnel shortly after their arrival. Most of the IOM requisitions for organizational equipment were filled and the equipment arrived with E Company. There is a standardization program for certain items of construction equipment, which includes replacement of the Allis-Chalmers HD-16 tractor with the Caterpillar D7E tractor.

(3) Class III. Fuel consumption during this period averaged approximately 1,800 gallons per day (1,200 Diesel and 600 MGS). Until recently, POL products were obtained at the Sub-Area Command Class III Point and fuel was dispensed in the Battalion area or at job sites from organic tank and pump units. Gasoline for kitchen field ranges is delivered by trailer-mounted tanks near the unit messes. POL products are now available at the Division Class III Point in the base camp.

(4) Class IV (construction). Materials for the base camp are received, stored, and issued by the S4. Materials are issued for projects approved by the engineer group having area construction responsibility. The group also controls the issue of supplies from depot stocks. Most supplies are not available at Sub-Area and must be obtained by organic transportation from Qui Nhon. The system is very complex and does not work satisfactorily. In addition, no personnel are provided in the MTOE to perform this function. The limited supply of materials (2x4s and plywood) brought to RVN was useful in meeting early requirements for

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construction, however, many items are currently in short supply (2x4s, hardware, plumbing fixtures, pipe fittings, and electrical wiring).

(5) Class V. The basic load of ammunition for the advance party accompanied that group. When the main body arrived, ammunition for individual weapons was issued. Basic loads of ammunition larger than .60 caliber were received at the ASP located near the port and shipped to base camp. Operational requirements for all items of Class V supply have been obtained from the Sub-Area Command Class V Point.

v. Transportation. Area transportation services have been adequate. It was necessary to use organic transportation to move Red TAT and organizational equipment from the port to base camp. In addition, most of the supplies must be moved from the depot at QUI NHON in organic vehicles. The 5-ton bridge trucks have been of great value in supporting this requirement.

w. Personnel, Administration and Finance.

(1) Personnel.

(a) At the end of the reporting period this unit had 100 percent of authorized enlisted personnel, and an excess of one officer. Although the strength is 100 percent, a shortage exists in grade E5 (58 percent of the authorized strength is assigned).

(b) There have been two reenlistments, one extension of foreign service tour, ten emergency leaves and two ordinary leaves for compassionate reasons.

(c) Local nationals are hired on a daily basis, under the Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) program, to augment manpower on construction projects. Local nationals have primarily been used to fill sandbags.

(d) Morale is high. A 16mm outdoor movie theater was built in the Headquarters Company area and seven movies a week are shown. The projector was bought by the Battalion and will be used until a projector is issued through Special Services. An Officers' Club and Non-Commissioned Officers' Club were established as were separate Enlisted Clubs in each company. The facilities for these clubs are presently in the planning and construction stage. Seventy out-of-country R&R and twenty in-country R&R quotas were filled.

(2) The Battalion was issued one set of USAFV Regulations on 31 July. As a result, some required reports were delayed. The time between 7 and 30 July (while the unit was aboard ship) could have been used to write Battalion and Company SOPs. USAFV Regulations, I FFORCEV SOP, and other pertinent publications were not available prior to deployment.

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(3) Due to an influx of personnel just prior to deployment, and insufficient time to review individual records, many individuals were improperly assigned. Once authorization was given to publish Special Orders, those personnel were transferred to the proper positions.

(4) Because of deployment ahead of the Division, the SI Section was augmented by attaching a Personnel and Finance Section (eight individuals from the 4th Administration Company) with appropriate records. This resulted in expeditious actions.

(5) Assistant Division Engineer (ADE).

(a) The Section became operational at Fort Lewis on 1 July and immediately started planning for base camp development.

(b) The ADE arrived in-country on 11 July and remained with the Division advance party at NHA TRANG as the engineer representative until 4 August, when he returned to base camp.

(c) From 4 August to 22 August, the section produced the Division Base Development Plan which was submitted to USARV for approval. During September and October the section continued to improve upon and supervise the development of base camp. Development photographs and layouts are attached (Inclosure 8).

9. (C) Signal.

a. The first element of the 124th Signal Battalion to disembark was the 2d Area Signal Center Platoon, B Company. They disembarked from Tacoma on 22 July aboard the USNS Walker. Upon arrival at base camp they provided communications for the 2d Brigade and Division Headquarters (-).

b. The advance composite company of 160 men departed on 2 September from McChord AFB and arrived on 4 September at PLEIKU. The responsibility for planning and controlling the expanding base camp communications system was assumed by the advance party.

c. In September, a platoon of the 278th Signal Company was attached to provide non-tactical communications support for the base camp. They established long distance trunk lines via VHF systems to PLEIKU, operated the Division switchboard and communications center, and installed required local trunk lines.

d. The Battalion (-) departed from Tacoma aboard the USNS Pope on 8 September with the Division Main Body. On 30 September, the Battalion debarked at QUI NHON, was flown to PLEIKU and trucked to base camp. The 1st Area Signal Center Platoon, B Company, moved to TUY HOA with the 1st Brigade.

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g. The remaining Battalion element, 3d Area Signal Center Platoon, B Company, part of the 3d Brigade, arrived at VUNG TAU on 12 October.

f. Within two weeks of arrival in base camp, area development had progressed as follows:

(1) Tent frames, latrines, showers and mess facilities were built in each company area.

(2) An Enlisted Men's club was established.

(3) A Post Exchange was built, stocked and operational.

(4) Motion pictures were being shown nightly.

(5) An Armed Forces Radio retransmission station was placed in operation, providing coverage to base camp and surrounding area.

(6) Bunkers and defensive fortifications were erected on the Battalion perimeter.

(7) Telephone communications were established between the DTOC and Sector Defense Headquarters, and between those headquarters and their control bunkers on the perimeter.

(8) Local telephone service was provided to all units of the base camp with switching facilities to connect into long distance trunk systems.

(9) Signal Hill (within the base camp perimeter) was leveled in preparation for a tactical radio communications emplacement (Inclosure 9).

g. Plans. An internal base camp outside cable plant (lines laid, but not connected to switchboards), to include pole lines and local cable runs to Division unit designator switchboards, was planned and is under construction (Inclosure 10).

h. Operations.

(1) VHF radio and carrier systems have been established on Signal Hill, providing communications between Division and the following:

(a) The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Forward Command Post, established 14 October, provided three hot line, one

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teletype and two common user trunks. This system was operational for six days and was reestablished 25 October at PLEI DJERENG. The new Forward Command Post, through Brigade rear, is presently providing five hot line, one teletype and three common-user trunks. These systems have been used during OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

(b) The 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Forward Command Post at OASIS, established 15 October, provided three hot line, two teletype and four common-user trunks. This system was operational thirteen days and was reestablished 29 October at PLEI DJERENG, the new Forward Command Post location, and is presently providing four hot line, three teletype and six common-user trunks. These systems have been used during OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

(c) 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Forward Command Post, established 20 October, provided three hot line and two common-user trunks. This system was operational for ten days.

(d) The 4th Infantry Division Forward Tactical Command Post, established vicinity PLEI DJERENG 23 October, provided four hot line and two common-user trunks. This system remained in operation for five days during OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

(e) 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division Command Post, established vicinity OASIS 29 October, provided four hot line and four common-user trunks presently in use for OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

(2) 4th Infantry Division Command Net #1 (HF & FM) and Command Net #3 (HF AM RATT) became operational on 11 October and 16 October respectively. They remain in 24-hour operation.

i. Training.

(1) Division mandatory training classes prior to oversea movement were conducted during August with 100 percent attendance.

(2) A shipboard training program was developed prior to oversea movement. From 9 through 29 September, one hour per day was spent in training classes and one-half hour per day in physical training.

j. Logistics.

(1) During August the Battalion was engaged in final preparation of vehicles and equipment for oversea movement.

(2) The exchange of organic generators for newly acquired 5 KW generators was a major activity in the final stage of POM.

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(3) Upon arrival at base camp, the Battalion sent an average of eight vehicles per day on a round trip to QUI NHON for equipment and WABTOC. A maximum of 21 vehicles were used on a single day's run for this purpose.

k. Civil Affairs.

(1) Approximately ninety local laborers per day have been used for development of the Battalion area, filling sandbags and clearing fields of fire.

(2) A local Vietnamese interpreter taught language classes two hours per week. He also was used to communicate with the village chiefs of PLEI IA NGOL and PLEI NHAO YUT, two neighboring villages in which the Battalion conducted weekly civic action programs. During each visit an average of twelve patients were treated by a doctor and medic. Educational materials have been provided the local school in PLEI NHAO YUT.

l. Personnel.

(1) A critical shortage of personnel with signal MOSs 31M20 (Radio Relay and Carrier Operator) and 05C20 (Radio-Teletype Operator) prevailed until the week prior to oversea movement.

(2) The maximum number of personnel were granted POM leave.

(3) Seventy filler personnel reported one week prior to oversea movement, creating a minor processing problem.

10. (U) Information Activities.

a. On 12 August one officer, three information specialists and one photographer were airlifted to RVN with a mission of providing information support to the 2d Brigade.

b. On 4 September the Division Information Officer arrived in-country with a staff of three.

c. On 6 September the Division Information Officer made a liaison visit to MACV, USARV, JUSPAO and I FFORCEV.

d. On 13 September the Information Section was tasked to coordinate welcoming ceremonies at Division Main, 1st and 3d Brigade debarkation sites.

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e. On 30 September Division Main debarked at QUI NHON. One officer and thirteen information specialists were with the main body. There was no civilian news media coverage.

f. On 5 October the 1st Brigade debarked at NHA TRANG. There were thirteen representatives of civilian news media present, representing AP, UPI, CBS, NBC, Stars and Stripes and New York Times.

g. On 10 October the 20th and 21st Public Information Detachments (one officer and three specialists) were assigned to the 3d and 1st Brigades, respectively.

h. On 12 October the 3d Brigade debarked at VUNG TAU. There was no civilian news media coverage.

i. Distribution of the Stars and Stripes to Division units was unsatisfactory until direct service from Tokyo to NHA TRANG was instituted in October and daily distribution was received from the Air Force drop-off. The 3d Brigade received distribution direct from Saigon.

j. The first issue of "The Ivy Leaf", a four-page Division newspaper, was published on 4 November. A printer in Saigon contracted to print the newspaper weekly.

k. During the reporting period twelve civilian correspondents visited the Division: Messrs. Peter Arnett (AP), Jonathan Fenby (Reuters), Orman Vertrees (Seattle Post-Intelligence), Junkins Jones (Tulsa Tribune), Allen Harkrader, Jr (Peoria Journal Star), Bruce Morton (CBS News), Howard Tuckner (NBC News), and Bob Kaynard, Al Webb and John Schneider (UPI). Artillery firing, medical evacuation, and search and destroy operations were covered by story and film.

l. On 21 October the Information Officer conducted a briefing for civilian correspondents at MACV headquarters. The briefing included the location and organization of the Division. Approximately 130 correspondents were present.

m. During the reporting period the Information Office has forwarded 411 Hometown News Releases to the Hometown News Center. During the same period 107 news feature stories and 17 photographs were cleared by MACV-IO and released to media in CONUS and RVN.

n. When the Division assumed operational control of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division on 18 October, a coordination meeting was held to insure complete and timely coverage of OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV. A 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division forward information press center (one officer, one non-commissioned officer and three specialists) was established with the Division Forward Tactical Command Post on 31 October.

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SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel.

a. ITEM: MOS Qualified Personnel.

Discussion: Officer personnel were assigned by MOS and not by qualification within the aviation NOS structure.

Observation: Assignments to units deploying overseas should be reviewed to send personnel qualified in aircraft organic to the assigned unit. This is especially true when little unit training time is available prior to deployment.

b. ITEM: Personnel Section Augmentation

Discussion: The ROAD concept of Infantry Division organization centralizes personnel services at division level. When the Engineer Battalion deployed in advance of the Division, an augmentation of eight Personnel and Finance Specialists was obtained from the 4th Administration Company. This augmentation was invaluable in completing POM requirements and expediting pay and personnel actions upon arrival in-country.

Observation: In division-sized deployments, personnel section augmentation for separate battalions is necessary, if the unit deploys and is to be operational before the division headquarters and support elements.

c. ITEM: POM Processing.

Discussion: POM teams consisted of individuals who were assigned to deploying units. This prevented accomplishment of normal day-to-day PSD operations.

Observation: POM should be accomplished by teams from units not deploying.

d. ITEM: Late Arrival of Filler Personnel and Critical Equipment.

Discussion: Although requests for filler personnel were initiated as early as June, personnel arrived as late as 28 August, resulting in many personal hardships. Also, this did not permit unit commanders to properly train personnel and teams who had to support tactical operations immediately upon arrival in-country. This is especially critical in technical units such as aviation and signal battalions.

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Observation: Requests for filler personnel, especially in critical grades and MOSs, should be honored on a priority basis as far in advance of the unit's deployment as possible, and not later than sixty days prior. Critical equipment, such as helicopters, should be furnished in the same time frame in order that men and equipment can be matched for training prior to departure.

e. ITEM: Retention and Reassignment of Non-deployable Personnel.

Discussion: As a result of the deployment order, an increase in requests for hardship discharge, compassionate reassignment and deferment occurred. Some personnel with pending actions were retained in the parent unit (they had to be POR qualified) until just before departure, when, as non-deployables, they were transferred. Many with approved deferments and actions pending were attached to a non-deploying unit, to return to the parent unit when personnel actions were complete. This created confusion in determining vacancies and preparing personnel manifests. Many personnel in the "pending action" category had their records shipped overseas because of reassignments after FDRFs were packed for shipment. Many in the latter category are still being carried on CONUS morning reports, as their status has not been finally determined.

Observation: Units deploying overseas should be allowed at least 45 days prior to unit departure to reassign those individuals granted deferment and who have personnel actions pending. Such personnel should be earmarked for reassignment to the deploying unit if they become available for movement.

f. ITEM: Advance Party.

Discussion: The limited size of the advance party made establishment of a base camp difficult since there were more planning than work-party personnel.

Observation: Advance parties should be sufficiently large to include an adequate labor force for base camp development prior to arrival of the main bodies.

g. ITEM: Deployment of Division Finance Sections.

Discussion: Most units will be intransit over a payday and require prompt payment upon arrival in-country. The deadlines to insure payment on arrival make it imperative that the finance section lose only a minimum of time between the closing of operations in CONUS and opening in-country. The Division transported its finance section by air and was capable of paying the in-country troops on the regular payday.

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Observation: Finance sections of divisions deploying to RVN should be permitted to remain in CONUS to prepare the first month's payroll to arrive about the same time as the main body and set up operations immediately upon arrival in country.

h. ITEM: Liaison Visit to USARV by the Finance Officer.

Discussion: To compensate for marginally dependable transportation and communications and limited time available for set-up, the Finance Officer or his deputy should make a personal liaison visit to USARV prior to reporting to the division base camp. Complete arrangements for the necessary authority to keep cash on hand, for the establishment of his depository accounts and for obtaining initial cash requirements should be made at this time.

Observation: Finance Officers must complete all arrangements for the establishment of operations prior to arrival at the division base camp. To insure accomplishment within a limited time frame, finance officers should spend at least three days at USARV prior to arrival at division base camp.

i. ITEM: TOE for Division Finance

Discussion: The manning level established by TOE is inadequate to meet operational requirements in RVN imposed by the deployment of two brigades to locations remote from the Division base camp. Separate finance teams at each of the brigade base camps are required. This fragmentation imposed an immediate problem to the operational and functional capability of the Finance Section. USARV recognized the problem and requested an increase of seventeen spaces for division finance sections deploying to RVN. Critical personnel include: cashiers, allotment clerks, travel clerks, accounting clerks and officers to function as Class "B" Agents.

Observation: Finance service can best be provided by stationing a finance team, operating as a Class "B" Agent Office, with each brigade. Therefore, division finance sections deploying to RVN should be provided a personnel augmentation of seventeen additional spaces to support requirements for in-country operations, pending DA revision of TOE 12-37E, and should also cross-train personnel, anticipating section fragmentation.

j. ITEM: POM Processing and Allotments.

Discussion: POM processing is conducted a month in advance of movement and prior to pre-deployment leaves, at which time many individuals have not settled their families, not established allotments and do not have a full perspective of all actions contemplated. Consequently, POM processing is at best incomplete and last minute changes are required

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to preclude individual monetary hardship. Possible delays of arrival in-country due to transportation failures should be considered when allotments involving overseas entitlements are discussed.

Observation: To be fully constructive, POM processing should be conducted after the member's return from pre-deployment leave. He should be counseled to initiate allotments that will become effective on the month following the month in which his unit is scheduled to arrive in-country.

k. ITEM: Safety

Discussion: Safety must continue to be uppermost in the minds of commanders. The attitude of "accidents will happen in war" is a negative one and must be avoided. Positive safety measures, coupled with command emphasis, can and will reduce non-hostile-action deaths and injuries.

Observation: Safety procedures must be constantly stressed at all levels.

2. (C) Operations:

a. ITEM: Landing Zone Clearing Teams.

Discussion: The clearing of helicopter LZs by division engineer units is of primary importance once the division becomes operational. The composition of the LZ clearing team used by the 4th Engineer Battalion is:

- 1 - MCOIC (12B40)
 - 2 - Chain saw operators (12B20) with chain saws, GED
 - 2 - Combat Demolition Specialists (12B20)
 - 1 - Radio AN/PRC 25
- Necessary gasoline, oil and explosives

Observation: Training in the technique of LZ clearing should be conducted while units are in the Advance Unit Training phase.

b. ITEM: Chain Saw Blades.

Discussion: Blades for Chain Saw, 18", GED, that are manufactured for use primarily in the softwood areas of the United States, wear out rapidly on the hardwoods of Southeast Asia.

Observation: Units deploying to RVN should acquire blades manufactured for use in hardwood forests. Best results have been obtained with trade names "Micro-Bit" and "Oregon Blades".

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c. ITEM: Filling Sandbags.

Discussion: To meet the requirement for filled sandbags, the Intrenching Machine, Combat, High Speed, is invaluable. Using this machine, with local laborers and military supervisors, a daily production of 20,000 filled sandbags has been achieved.

Observation: Division engineer battalions should request a modification to TOE to include Intrenching Machine, Combat, High Speed, FSN 3805-727-6719.

d. ITEM: Deployment During Monsoon Season.

Discussion: The 4th Engineer Battalion arrived at its final base camp locations at the height of the monsoon season. The heavy rains for the first 45 days severely hampered the off-highway movement of supplies and equipment and the construction effort.

Observation: Arrival of units in-country to begin base camp development and construction should be scheduled during the dry season.

e. ITEM: Helicopter Requirements

Discussion: Heavy demands for helicopter support have required scheduling of all available helicopters. To provide increased availability, missions are being screened and evaluated according to priority and a program of flying hours is being monitored to preclude excessive maintenance down-time due to over-scheduling.

Observation: A solution is to allocate a predetermined number of aircraft with a specified number of flying hours to the supported organization each day. The commander, based on his knowledge of the immediate tactical situation, uses the available aviation assets as he deems appropriate. Administrative missions not associated with tactical requirements must be monitored closely to determine their priority. Requests have been so numerous that all flyable helicopters have been scheduled each day, to the detriment of the scheduled maintenance program.

f. ITEM: Advance Party Signal Operations.

Discussion: The Division advance party ~~and~~ main body ~~arrived~~ in the base camp at essentially the same time as the ~~communications elements~~.

Observation: Major difficulties are encountered in providing adequate signal support when all elements arrive concurrently.

g. ITEM: Base Camp Communications Operation.

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Discussion: It is difficult, without a major disruption of service, to extract communications equipment for tactical operations after it has been installed in the base camp complex.

Observation: Personnel and equipment assets of division signal battalions are not sufficient to operate a base camp communications complex and support a tactical operation simultaneously.

h. ITEM: Artillery Concentrations.

Discussion: When an enemy cache, tunnel system or other installation is destroyed, artillery should be adjusted on the site, and the target should be designated a defensive concentration. This is especially important if the friendly unit intends to remain nearby overnight.

Observation: The enemy will return to destroyed installations and to the battlefield to inspect and recover equipment and dead when friendly troops withdraw.

i. ITEM: Light Anti-Tank Weapon System (LAWS).

Discussion: LAWS cannot be employed in tight perimeters because of danger to friendly troops.

Observation: Perimeter shifts to provide back blast areas may permit effective employment of LAWS at critical times during heavy engagements. In most cases the use of LAWS in a defensive role is not considered practical.

j. ITEM: Employment of Grenadiers While Moving.

Discussion: A squad leader should keep an M79 grenadier nearby while moving to direct his squad's fires. This is especially important in dense jungle where the effectiveness of hand signals is limited.

Observation: Controlled and directed fire of M79 grenade launchers maximizes their effect and should result in higher enemy casualties.

k. ITEM: Employment of Grenadiers in Defensive Perimeters.

Discussion: The enemy concentrates automatic weapons' fire on friendly machine guns and automatic rifles. In a well-fortified position, M79 grenadiers, especially at night, can pick out targets by using a machine gun or automatic rifle to draw fire. When the enemy engages, the grenadier has a chance to pinpoint and knock out the enemy weapons.

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Observation: The procedure described above has been used with excellent results.

l. ITEM: Enemy Snipers.

Discussion: Snipers generally work in pairs or small groups. Only one will initially fire at friendly troops. Other enemy wait while the one either allows himself to be seen or makes distinct noises. This trick may be employed to cause friendly troops to carelessly attempt to outflank the enemy, in which case the other enemy, usually on a flank, get a clear shot.

Observation: When fired at, exposed troops should make an estimate of the situation and, by fire and maneuver, move to the flank or rear of the enemy.

m. ITEM: Cratering Charges.

Discussion: Often a hilltop or high area may be rocky or thickly rooted, defying digging-in.

Observation: Cratering charges should be kept available for use by units who need them to construct defensive positions in unyielding terrain.

n. ITEM: Claymore Mines.

Discussion: Claymore mines can always be used effectively around a perimeter and are ideal for ambushes.

Observation: Each squad member, except those armed with an M79 or machine gun, should carry one Claymore mine on combat operations.

o. ITEM: Trip Flares and Smoke Grenades.

Discussion: At night, flares are useful for warning, illuminating targets and outlining perimeters. In jungle, often the only daylight contact with aircraft is smoke.

Observation: Every man should carry one trip flare and one smoke grenade on combat operations.

p. ITEM: Anti-Intrusion Devices.

Discussion: Anti-intrusion devices are effective when integrated with other defensive means.

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Observation: Two anti-intrusion devices per squad should be carried on combat operations.

q. ITEM: Palletized Communications Packets.

Discussion: Loss of radio communications at a vital time is always a possibility. Immediate reestablishment of communications is imperative.

Observation: Consideration should be given to the development of a palletized communications packet containing an AN/VRC-46 Radio with an RC-292 antenna which can be delivered by helicopter.

r. ITEM: NVA Tactics.

Discussion: During a coordinated attack, the NVA maneuvered against a sector of a perimeter while pinning down the forces within by intense rocket and mortar fire. Enemy riflemen attempting to penetrate the perimeter are believed to have fired only one quarter of their individual basic load of small arms ammunition. It is also believed that the volume of supporting automatic weapons fire was not representative of the ammunition available for the assault. Therefore, it is theorized that the enemy was attempting to penetrate before expending the majority of his basic load, thus enhancing his capability to (1) withstand a counter attack or (2) exploit his success.

Observation: This tactic points up the critical requirement to determine the location of the enemy's main attack. Once determined, all available fire support must be applied, without delay, to spoil the attack. A reaction force supported by automatic weapons must be positioned to react to any threatened sector.

s. ITEM: Use of Flashlights.

Discussion: Flashlights aimed skyward can be effectively used to mark a friendly perimeter when there is a requirement for close air support. They should be tied within reach of foxholes.

Observation: This tactic should be used with caution since the enemy may turn on flashlights and misdirect air strikes. Radio or telephone, rather than voice commands, should be used to minimize this disadvantage.

t. ITEM: NVA Indicators.

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Discussion: Most NVA contacts are in proximity to trails. Close scrutiny may reveal vines and bamboo used by the enemy to guide his movement at night. Gray communications wire may be found. Usually there is one main trail about five feet wide with numerous branch trails.

Observation: A good estimate of the situation and analysis of the indicators can exploit the discovery.

u. ITEM: Emergency Signals.

Discussion: When moving into a position for the night, a large pile of brush and wood should be gathered for use as an emergency signal.

Observation: This technique can be used as a back-up means of marking should other means fail.

v. ITEM: RC-292 Antennas.

Discussion: As a means of maintaining communications in dense jungle, use of the RC-292 antenna has proved very successful.

Observation: Companies conducting operations in the jungle should employ an RC-292 antenna.

w. ITEM: Use of Napalm.

Discussion: During a recent attack the enemy dug-in within fifty meters of friendly positions. Napalm dropped on such positions is an effective method of routing the enemy, however, friendly troops must be well protected.

Observation: Thus far our units, in well dug-in positions, have called for napalm within fifty meters of their positions with no resulting injuries.

x. ITEM: Overhead Cover.

Discussion: During a recent NVA attack 75 percent of friendly WIA resulted from enemy mortar fire.

Observation: Extra effort should be made to secure overhead cover.

y. ITEM: Mutual Support.

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Discussion: Employment of companies in mutually supporting roles enhances communications relay and reserve reaction capability. Fire support bases should be mutually supporting. Artillery within a fire base cannot adequately provide the number of close-in defensive fires required during an attack. Further, in mountainous terrain there often are "dead-spaces" in the fire base's area of influence. By locating fire bases so that they are mutually supporting, adequate close-in defensive fires can be provided and "dead spaces" can be covered.

Observation: Mutually supporting positions should always be a planning objective.

2. ITEM: Artillery Fire Support.

Discussion: During an enemy attack against a defensive position, it is often desirable to have artillery "fire for effect" start about 400 meters in front of friendly positions. By employing this technique, the fires of an entire battery can be "walked in". This places blocking fire across routes of enemy withdrawal, disrupts his communications and subsequently drives him up against the perimeter fires.

Observation: This technique has proved successful against the enemy and offers the added advantage of providing additional safety to friendly troops.

3. (U) Training and Organization.

a. ITEM: Designation of Table of Organization and Equipment.

Discussion: Many problems connected with POM and POR activities were occasioned by late TOE designations and subsequent changes. For example, the Division received Sixth Army General Order 135 (designating TOEs under which units of the Division were to be organized) on 25 July, after the 2d Brigade had deployed. Later, messages were received directing significant changes to GO 135.

Observation: Units alerted for oversea movement must have their organization "fixed" in sufficient time to allow personnel and equipment levels to stabilize. Stabilization is dependent upon requisition action, which in turn is dependent upon the designation of TOE and changes thereto.

b. ITEM: Operational Training for Aviation Personnel.

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Discussion: On arrival in RVN, the Division faced the problem of qualifying helicopter crews in the operational environment. Several methods were used. One was infusion, which provided an immediate input of seasoned personnel and at the same time leveled the DEROS hump. Another was to place newly arrived personnel on TDY with operational units.

Observation: Each method had its own advantages, but it was learned that a COMBINATION of each gave the best results. When the helicopter crews receive training in more than one unit they can use the best methods learned in each unit. Infused personnel give the unit a permanent experience base, however, personnel turbulence is a factor to consider if significant numbers of personnel are involved.

c. ITEM: Training in Infantry Small Unit Tactics.

Discussion: Prior to deployment, support units conducted extensive training in their mission, with the basic philosophy that only minimum security requirements for interior guard would be necessary. Upon arrival in-country, significant numbers of personnel in these units were involved in perimeter defense, patrolling and convoy security.

Observation: Service support units deploying to RVN should train extensively in infantry small unit tactics prior to deployment.

4. (C) Intelligence.

a. ITEM: Map Supply.

Discussion: Maps issued prior to movement were found to be obsolete upon arrival in-country and resupply procedures forced units to use the old series, some sheets of which were missing.

Observation: Current maps should be issued to units prior to arrival in RVN. If this is not possible, supply agencies should be responsive to the requirements of newly arrived units to preclude use of outdated map sheets on combat operations.

b. ITEM: Initial Intelligence Requirements.

Discussion: There is an immediate requirement for intelligence concerning hostile ground-to-air fire before an aviation unit begins operations in an area. Current intelligence summaries are usually available, but are not detailed enough for flight planning. There is a need for a means to supplement these summaries.

Observation: A hostile ground-to-air fire chart is a valuable asset in flight planning. The initial information for the chart can be obtained by liaison with other aviation units. This information is best.

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disseminated through daily briefings and by making current information readily available to all personnel involved in flight planning.

c. ITEM: Lack of Linguists.

Discussion: The Military Intelligence Detachment has no qualified Vietnamese linguists assigned. This makes counter-intelligence and interrogation personnel completely dependent upon ARVN interpreters. Such a situation is disadvantageous because most ARVN interpreters are not facile in the English language and are not familiar with military terminology in either language. The result is that translations are often distorted and inaccurate. Additionally, US personnel have no means of determining the veracity of the interpreter's translation.

Observation: As a minimum, three US personnel qualified as Vietnamese linguists should be assigned to military intelligence detachments, thereby eliminating total dependence upon ARVN interpreters.

d. ITEM: Montagnard Language Barrier.

Discussion: Neither US personnel assigned to the Military Intelligence Detachment nor the ARVN interpreters are qualified Montagnard linguists. This situation creates an operational inconvenience and often denies the acquisition of immediate tactical intelligence. At present, interrogation of Montagnard detainees and local civilians encountered in daily operations must be delayed until a Montagnard interpreter can be "borrowed" from a CIDG camp, II Corps or an ARVN Sector or Sub-Sector.

Observation: Montagnard interpreters who have a Vietnamese language capability or, preferably, a knowledge of the English language, should be obtained and attached to the military intelligence detachments operating in the Central Highlands of RVN.

e. ITEM: Integration of NVA and VC Infrastructure.

Discussion: Recent agent reports have indicated that a number of NVA cadre are now working with the VC infrastructure to bolster that organization and to provide better local logistic support to the NVA units. Reported increases in VC propaganda campaigns during the months of September and October may be the groundwork for such activities.

Observation: The integration of NVA personnel into the VC organization makes it necessary to exploit NVA captives for knowledge of the VC infrastructure. Actions to neutralize the trend toward integration may be village sweeps to round up "black list" personalities, trail interdictions to halt movements of supplies and food, and civic action programs designed to belie NVA appeals. These actions can combine to rob the infrastructure

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of key personnel, prevent the establishment of base areas, supply caches and training facilities, and deny information of the activities and movements of friendly forces.

f. ITEM: Classified Material

Discussion: Deploying units carried too much classified material as Yellow TAT.

Observation: Units should review classified documents and send those not needed during movement by airmail. Safes shipped Red TAT eliminate the administrative problems connected with other modes of surface shipment.

5. (U) Logistics.

a. ITEM: Loading of Essential Equipment.

Discussion: Initial set-up in the base camp was hampered by the lack of tentage. Many tents had been packed in CONEX containers which were not available when the troops arrived.

Observation: Dispersion of tentage and other essential equipment in vehicles and trailers would have made the necessary items available, since combat essential equipment arrives prior to Yellow TAT.

b. ITEM: Direct Support Aviation Maintenance.

Discussion: Requirements for direct support aviation maintenance developed almost simultaneously with arrival of support units in-country. The direct support aviation maintenance unit required time to establish its support facilities and administrative procedures. Consequently, the optimum support was not immediately available.

Observation: Direct support aviation maintenance units should arrive in-country prior to supported units, thereby enabling units to provide immediate support upon arrival of the supported unit.

c. ITEM: WABTOC Kits.

Discussion: Lack of WABTOC kits retarded base camp development.

Observation: WABTOC kits should be phased-in as units arrive in-country.

d. ITEM: Ammunition Resupply.

Discussion: During the early part of PAUL REVIRE IV, artillery

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ammunition resupply to the forward area posed a problem due to the distance ammunition had to be moved. Trucks, helicopters and C-124 aircraft were used to alleviate the problem. However, after the FSA was established, this problem was significantly reduced.

Observation: The FSA must be established almost simultaneously with the start of the operation and must have a three-day stock of artillery ammunition of all calibers supporting the operation.

e. ITEM: Base Camp Communications Facilities.

Discussion: The tactical switchboard, although designed to operate under field conditions, is not performing adequately in this area due to the abrasive action of dust particles on moving keys and relays. Electro-mechanical teletype is also susceptible to breakdown as a result of dust particles on sensitive relays and contacts which require close tolerances. Operation of cryptographic equipment in extreme temperatures becomes erratic and unreliable.

Observation: Critical signal equipment such as switchboards, teletypewriters and ancillary cryptographic machinery require a dust and temperature-controlled environment.

f. ITEM: Delayed POM Inspection Schedule.

Discussion: In some instances POM inspections were conducted 14 days prior to ERD. This did not allow the unit sufficient time to obtain items declared short or not serviceable.

Observation: Spot-check inspections for POM deficiencies at least 30 days prior to ERD would provide a realistic time frame to obtain shortages and permit orderly packing.

g. ITEM: Shipment of Class I and Class V as Red TAT.

Discussion: All units were required to deploy with five days of combat rations and the basic load of ammunition below .60 caliber. Upon arrival in-country, rations and ammunition were readily available, the latter being issued at port of debarkation. Class I and V Red TAT limited the amount of other essential cargo that could have accompanied units.

Observation: Units deploying to RVN should do so without basic loads of Class I and V.

h. ITEM: Repair Parts Supply.

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Discussion: There is an in-country shortage of repair parts. This is especially true of engineer and ordnance items due to the variety of equipment makes and models in theater. Units deploying to RVN must carry a minimum of two fifteen-day prescribed load lists of engineer and ordnance repair parts.

Observation: Authority to establish a stockage of two prescribed load lists will enhance unit capability to keep equipment in operation. One prescribed load list should accompany units as Red TAT.

i. ITEM: Resupply during Search and Destroy Operations.

Discussion: During OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV considerable difficulty was experienced in accomplishing necessary coordination between the Division G4, the Logistics Operations Center at PLEIKU Sub-Area Command, the FSA Task Force Commander and the FSEs. Brigade FSEs place individual requirements directly on the FSA. The FSA fills all requirements on a first-come, first-served basis and is not in a position to establish priorities. When the FSA is supporting only one brigade, no problem is posed; however, with more than one, the supply assets on hand must be allocated based on the overall plan for the operations.

Observation: To insure proper distribution of supplies, division representatives should accompany the FSE. Representatives from the division ammunition, transportation and supply offices should be a part of the FSE and, in conjunction with division G3s and G4s, allocate available supplies and establish road priorities for resupply convoys. Timely information must be furnished by G4s to Sub-Area Commands on the number of days of supplies to be stocked per day at the FSA. In turn, the DAO and DSO representatives at the FSA must keep G4s informed on the levels of supplies in stock.

j. ITEM: Paper Plates and Plastic Utensils.

Discussion: Use of these items by combat and combat support units during operations considerably reduces feeding time and improves sanitation. In forward units, as a general rule, facilities for washing metal mess kits are poor and at times unavailable. As a result, soldiers are unable to properly clean their mess equipment.

Observation: Use of paper plates and plasticware for feeding troops reduces feeding time and improves sanitation.

k. ITEM: Deployment of Logistical Units.

Discussion: The arrival of Division Main in-country generated an immediate requirement for logistical support, particularly in the area of maintenance.

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Observation: Logistical units should be operational in-country before the arrival of supported units. When deploying from a post, camp or station, support in the area of logistics could be shifted to post organizations to enable early deployment of logistical units.

1. ITEM: Unit Authorized Stockage List (ASL).

Discussion: Some units did not have their in-country ASL built up to the recommended levels prior to M-Day.

Observation: An ASL was developed in CONUS using the information gathered from a liaison trip to RVN. The ASL was requisitioned, but units deployed prior to receipt of all parts.

m. ITEM: Fluctuation in Authorized Equipment Levels.

Discussion: Equipment was laterally transferred from one unit to another in anticipation that shortages would be filled prior to deployment of the last unit. This fluctuation in equipment levels adversely affected accuracy of USCONARC Form 801-Rs.

Observation: Priority of issue should be given to deploying units and lateral transfer, if necessary, be made from non-deploying units in sufficient time to stabilize authorized equipment levels.

n. ITEM: Unit Movement Data.

Discussion: Accuracy at the unit level is one of the keys to a smooth deployment operation. Each phase of the operation is dependent on timely and accurate unit input to insure valid movement documentation. For the Division move, many vehicle and equipment lists arrived piecemeal, with some units submitting as many as five supplemental and/or corrected lists. Passenger lists in all cases were not firmed up soon enough to prepare valid passenger manifests for the carrier prior to their deadline.

Observation: There must be enough time between POM and ERD/PRD to allow at least six days to prepare personnel and equipment lists, after which changes must be held to an absolute minimum.

o. ITEM: CONEX Containers.

Discussion: CONEX containers were not released to many units until shortly before their respective ERDs. This resulted in packing delays and subsequently caused feeder reports, which were the basis for preparing shipping documents, to be late.

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Observation: Units should be issued the requested number of CONEX containers at least thirty days prior to commencement of preparation for overseas movement to minimize loading and weighing problems and permit completion of packing by ERD.

p. ITEM: Guide List of Essential Medical Items.

Discussion: Based on professional knowledge and information received from medical units in-country, the Medical Battalion compiled a list of items to be brought to RVN. Because of insufficient time, the unit deployed before requisitions were filled.

Observations: A standard list of RVN peculiar items should be made available to deploying units in sufficient time to insure receipt of items requisitioned through supply channels.

q. ITEM: Medical Equipment Repairman.

Discussion: The allocation of a single TOE position for a medical equipment repairman is not adequate for a division in RVN in view of the distance brigades are from the Medical Supply Officer (MSO). One man cannot make the timely repairs to equipment required by the demands of medical facilities supporting combat operations.

Observation: A second medical equipment repairman is needed for divisions deployed in RVN.

r. ITEM: Class III Flight Physicals.

Discussion: There have been an unusual number of requests for Class III Flight Physicals. The majority of these requests are from personnel in TOE non-crew member flying positions and who were assigned just prior to deployment. Class III Flight Physicals are difficult to schedule in RVN.

Observation: Had these personnel been assigned earlier, flight physicals could have been accomplished in CONUS.

Part II: Recommendations.

1. (U) Personnel.

That units scheduled for overseas movement be filled a minimum of sixty days prior to deployment.

2. (C) Intelligence.

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a. That Military Intelligence Detachments contain a minimum of three US personnel qualified as Vietnamese linguists.

b. That local national Montagnard interpreters be attached to Military Intelligence Detachments.

3. (U) Operations.

a. That a firm TOE or MTOE designation be given to a unit deploying overseas at least ninety days prior to deployment.

b. That arrival ports for debarking elements be designated as early as possible and that changes to unit locations in-country be made only in the event of a tactical emergency.

c. That units not be deployed to RVN in the monsoon season in other than tactical emergencies or when the move will be to a prepared base camp.

4. (U) Logistics.

a. That paper plates and plasticware be issued to combat battalions in the AO with each A or B ration. *(New Boring done - all)*

b. That base camp development plans include dust and temperature controlled communication centers and hospital wards.

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as

A. S. Collins, Jr.
A. S. COLLINS, JR.
Major General, United States Army
Commanding


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


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PAUL REVERE IV

CAMBODIA

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GE

2 October 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation FAMOUS FRIEND

TO: Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDDH-GC
APO San Francisco 96262

1. GENERAL:

a. OPLAN FAMOUS FRIEND I (Inclosure 1)

b. The operation commenced at 010700 October with the movement of the RF Co from PLEI DO LIM to screen the hamlets of PLEI KIEU AR810330, PLEI GYUM AR818325, PLEI LE ANH AR824324, PLEI LE LANN AR820320, PLEI KHOIH JET AR803316 and PLEI HLU KLAH AR840328. At 010845 the US Civic Action Task Force moved by convoy, vicinity AR821323. At this location the Task Force was met by MAJ Park, PLEI DO LIM Sub-Sector Advisor and the Sub-District Chief Aspirant Buon, along with some 300 villagers. LTC Braim (Division G5) and LTC Dyaico (Division Surgeon) were introduced to Mr. Buon and the chiefs of the hamlets involved.

c. At LTC Braim's request, Mr. Buon spoke to all the villagers, explaining the US presence in the area and assuring them that the 4th Infantry Division was here to help them and to help the GVN protect them and their property. Villagers were also requested to notify US authorities, through the Sub-District Chief, of any VC activity in the area. They were told that if mortars fall into our camp we would have to fire back and that many of them could be wounded. It is believed that this situation was understood by the people.

d. The major part of the operation involved sick call, conducted by two 4th Infantry Division Medical Officers, two 4th Infantry Division Medical Corpsmen and two Vietnamese Nurses. Approximately 120 patients were treated for illnesses ranging from the common cold to pneumonia. Tentative plans were made to conduct sick call once a week, pending availability of medicine. PFO coverage was provided.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation FAMOUS FRIEND

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2. PROBLEMS.

a. Transportation posed a problem, since all $\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicles with radios were on the perimeter and were not available for the Task Force. This problem would have been alleviated if both G5 vehicles had been available. Both vehicles were at QUI NEON.

b. Montagnards are a very curious people, which made it difficult to keep them in line. This situation slowed down the sick call and created some overcrowding around the doctors.

c. There was no Montagnard interpreter with the Task Force. Fortunately, the Sub-Sector Team had an interpreter, who proved to be indispensable.

d. No tent was available and sick call had to be conducted in the open. While this did not create any serious difficulties, a tent, tables, and chairs should be earmarked for the Division MEDCAP Team.

e. A better means of conversing with the people is required in order to gain intelligence. This problem should be resolved as more contact is made with them.

f. More pharmaceuticals are needed for the treatment of upper respiratory diseases and children. This problem may be alleviated when MEDCAP II supplies are received.

g. The positive identification of hamlet chiefs is a problem. The plan is to take pictures and maintain a file.

h. A system for evacuating seriously ill must be established. An evacuation vehicle should be included in future operations.

3. CONCLUSIONS. Operation FAMOUS FRIEND I was an excellent point of departure for operations of this type. It provided the Division with valuable information concerning the needs and desires of the people. It provided a sounding board for the Division's message of reciprocity to the people, and contacts were made with GVN officials and villagers which should prove invaluable in the months to come.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Operations of this type, on a scale commensurate with the needs of the particular area and Division's resources, should be conducted once a week.

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SUBJECT: After action Report, Operation FAMOUS FRIEND

b. The Division Surgeon should establish a Division MEDCAP Team for the purpose of conducting sick call in nearby villages.

c. The interpreters should be permanently assigned to the Division Surgeon for MEDCAP purposes so that they may become familiar with medical terminology.

d. A tent, three folding tables, and six chairs should be made available to the Division Surgeon for the purpose of conducting MEDCAP.

e. A medical evacuation vehicle should be made available to the Division Surgeon for MEDCAP operations.

f. Consideration should be given to the inclusion of Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) Entertainment Teams, 4th Infantry Division Band, US and GVN interrogators, and Psychological Operation Teams in future operations.

1 Incl
OPLAN FAMOUS FRIEND I

/s/Paul F. Braim
PAUL F. BRAIM
LTC GS
ACofS, G5

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HQ, 4th Infantry Division
DRAGON MOUNTAIN, RVN (AR802355)
261700 Sep 66
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OPLAN FAMOUS FRIEND I

Task Organization:

- a. GVN Officials.
- b. US Advisors, PLEI DO LIM Sub-district.
- c. RF Co, PLEI DO LIM Sub-district.
- d. CA/Psy Ops Det, PLEI DO LIM Sub-district.
- e. US Civic Action TF Comdr: Lt Col Braim, Div G5
- f. CA Team, 4th Div G5 Section.
- g. Info Team, 4th Div Info Ofc.
- h. Det, 4th Med Bn.

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces: Current INTSUM.
- b. Friendly Forces:
 - (1) Four RF companies are stationed at PLEI DO LIM (AR802355).
 - (2) 4th Div Reaction Force supports TF, on call.
 - (3) DIVARTY furnishes fire support to TF, on call.
- c. Attachments and Detachments: Task Orgn.

2. MISSION. The 4th Inf Div (-) and PLEI DO LIM Sub-district on D-day will conduct a joint civic action operation within the immediate area of 4th Div Base Camp, with concurrence of GVN officials.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations:

- (1) One RF company of PLEI DO LIM Sub-district screens the hamlets and conducts appropriate interrogations of PLEI KHOIH JET (AR803313), PLEI GYEM (AR810330), PLEI LE ANH (824324), PLEI LE LAMN (AR820320),

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PLEI HLU KLAH (AR840328). US Civic Action TF joins RF Co and GVN officials at center of hamlet cluster (AR821323) and conducts sick call and civic action survey. Annex 4, Operations Overlay.

(2) Arty and mortars provide on-call fire support from within base camp.

b. RF Co, PLEI DO LIM:

(1) Screen hamlets of PLEI KHOIH JET, PLEI GYUM, PLEI LE ANH, PLEI LE LANN, PLEI HLU KLAH.

(2) Conduct appropriate interrogations to determine presence of VC influence or activity in the area.

(3) Protect US Civic Action Task Force.

c. DIVARTY.

(1) Provide Arty and mortar fires on call.

(2) Provide FO to RF CO.

d. CA Psy Ops Det, PLEI DO LIM Sub-district: Conduct appropriate psychological operations.

e. Detachment, 4th Med Bn:

(1) Conduct sick call.

(2) Make a health survey of the population.

(3) Coordinate emergency medical evacuation.

f. Civil Affairs Team, 4th Div G5 Section:

(1) Supervise US civic actions.

(2) Make a civic actions survey of all hamlets.

g. Information Team, 4th Div Info Ofc: Publicize civic actions completed.

h. C/3/12: Provide platoon size reaction force to move on 30 min notice.

i. SUP-COM: Provide three 2½ ton trucks for reaction force.

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OPLAN FAMOUS FRIEND I

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J. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Operations of this combined task force will be directed by mutual agreement between GVN officials and US Civic Action Task Force Commander.

(2) All units will submit a complete after-action report.

(3) Liaison between Arty FO and RF Co is directed.

(4) Effective for planning, for execution on order. D-day o/a 1 Oct.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. US TF carry C rations for one meal.

b. Detachment, 4th Med Bn responsible for providing tentage and equipment for the conduct of sick call.

c. Emergency medical evacuation coordinated by Det, 4th Med Bn.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Signal:

(1) Call signs, TF Cmdr - Shady Boxer 9, RF Co - Shady Boxer 10, C/3/12 Inf - Shady Boxer 83L.

(2) Frequency: 57.20

(3) Report every half hour.

b. Command: Combined CP at AR 821325.

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2 - C/3/12

1 - PLEIKU Province Advisor

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
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DRAGON MOUNTAIN, RVN (AR802355)
261700 Sep 66
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Annex A (Operation Overlay) to O-ORD 8-66 (FAMOUS FRIEND I)
Map: Vietnam: 1:50,000, FLEIKU, Sheet 6636 IV.



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A Background Discussion of the Recent Montagnard Amity Celebration

By LTC Paul F. Brain, ACoFS, G5, 4th Infantry Division

The Montagnard tribes which surround our base camp are of the Djarai tribe, one of the more advanced of the major Montagnard tribes inhabiting the highlands of South Vietnam. The Djarai circle our camp to the east and southeast and touch at PLEIKU with the Bahmar tribe, which is another large tribe whose hamlets are off to the west and northwest. Together, these two tribes comprise about one-third of the total mountain population of South Vietnam - a population of about 800,000. Two other tribes of importance in the general region are the Sedang (a less-civilized tribe centered in KONTUM Province), and the Rhade (one of the more advanced and largest tribes centered around BAN ME THOUT). These tribes and some seven or eight other major highland tribes are of Malayo-Polynesian and Mon-Khmer stock, and differ racially from the Annamese-Chinese stock who inhabit the lowlands. The Montagnard is generally taller, darker, and has straighter, broader features than his Vietnamese brothers. Normally his living within the mountains, with limited means of communication, has caused him to have a less-advanced civilization. Some of the tribes have been judged to be as far back in civilized development as the New Stone Age; others, such as the Rhade, are considered to be relatively well advanced on the road toward modernization, primarily as a result of their contacts along the roads and in the major cities. In any case, the Montagnards are considerably behind the Vietnamese in cultural attainments and in their abilities to deal with the problems of 20th-century living, including the problems of war and foreign assistance.

The major difficulty between the Vietnamese and the mountain people has been one of racial and social tensions. Traditionally, the Vietnamese have regarded the mountain people as a lower order of human. The mountain people have often been spoken of by the Vietnamese as "noi" or savages, thus the second-class citizen status which historically has been conferred upon the Montagnards by the Vietnamese. This has resulted in mutual antagonism and a certain amount of distrust on both sides.

The mountain people were befriended by the French during the latter stages of the French occupation for emotional, political, and economic reasons. The French liked the mountain people for their simple approach to life, their lack of resistance to French domination, and for the honesty and courage they displayed in battle. The French, at this time (in the early 1950's), were having trouble with the Viet Minh, who were predominantly Vietnamese lowlanders, and this possibly reinforced the French affection for the mountain people, who seemed satisfied with French rule. In addition, many of the French plantations and business interests were concentrated in the highlands and, for this reason, it is assumed that the French took an interest in maintaining their presence there. Toward the latter days of the French hold in Indochina,

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they tended to deal with the highlanders as a separate entity, which led the highlanders to demand a separate state within a state in the new country of Vietnam. It is alleged by many who studied the Montagnard-Vietnamese difficulties that much, which was later to lead to revolt on the part of the Montagnard, was fomented by the French in the period 1954 through 1957 in an attempt to regain economic, if not political, hegemony in the highlands. Certainly it is known that the Viet Cong, successors to the Viet Minh, have taken advantage of Montagnard-Vietnamese antagonisms to promise the mountaineers all that they seek from the Vietnamese government in the way of autonomy and recognition of their rights as citizens. The Vietnamese government itself has, until recently, done very little to ameliorate the tensions between the two groups. In 1961, during the Diem regime (the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem), a deliberate policy was initiated to resettle lowlanders in the highlands. This resettlement was, on the surface, merely an attempt to occupy land not densely populated with refugees from the north or by Viet Cong. But it played into the hands of the Viet Cong and into the hands of the Montagnard separatists, because it seemed to indicate to the mountain people that the lowlanders were taking the best land and were pushing them out of lands that their tribes had traditionally inhabited.

One of the problems in this regard has always been the Montagnard's inability to compete with the Vietnamese in terms of legality. It is particularly a problem in that the highlanders often do not have a formal title to their lands. Those who had lived for generations in regions established by their tribes were semi-nomadic, in that a "slash and burn" type of agriculture is practiced, characterized by movement from one area to another as the land is exhausted. They possess no formal certificates of land ownership, nor do they, in many instances, possess identity cards or birth certificates. A complete census of the tribes has never been taken, and many of the tribal leaders are illiterate, even in their own language. Many of these languages have only been reduced to writing in the past few years, largely by the efforts of missionaries.

The Montagnard disturbances broke out in 1957 and 1958. These were protests against remaining within the Vietnamese National framework, characterized by expressions of grievances at various meetings in BAN ME THOUT and PLEIKU by certain self-styled leaders of a Montagnard movement for separation from Vietnam. One of the major leaders was a Rhade named Y Bham. Y Bham first expressed his stand at a meeting in PLEIKU in 1957. He demanded that the separate state of Champa (representing the Montagnard people and existing under the French according to his statement) be recognized by the Vietnamese as a state within a federation. This federation would consist of a Republic of the Highlands and a Republic of the Lowlands, united into a single Federation of Vietnam. Other grievances were expressed at this time: the lack of the equality before the law, the

lack of equality in appointments to civil and military offices, the refusal of the Vietnamese to allow the Montagnard dialects to be taught in schools, and injustices of a social nature which were apparently a feature of Vietnamese-Montagnard relations.

In 1961 the Front for the Unification and Liberation of Oppressed Races was formed. This front, called FULRO, formally sought a separation of the Montagnard people from the Vietnamese. The leaders of the front were Y Bham, Y Bih Alio (who was declared to be the Vice-President of the Front and who was supposed to have been appointed to this position by the Viet Cong), and a third man who had the christian name of Paul Duer. (Paul Duer's Montagnard name is not known.) This front (with these three leaders and others of lesser importance) appealed to the US, to various foreign governments, and to the Vietnamese themselves for recognition of their separate state. Because of the hostile reaction on the part of the Vietnamese to these appeals, the Front's leaders gradually moved toward Cambodia, so that by 1964 Cambodia was the headquarters site of FULRO. At this time, another force entered the scene to complicate the problem of relations between the Vietnamese and the Montagnards. In late 1961, US Special Forces (USSF) camps were established in the highlands, around which clustered Montagnard civilians formed into Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). The CIDG were organized and trained by the USSF, who found, as did many Americans who worked with the Montagnards, that they were a brave and hardy people, inured to suffering, ready to sacrifice, friendly in their relations with the Americans, and intensely loyal and honest. The USSF developed a special affinity for these simple folk because they were good in the type of fighting which the CIDG were organized to conduct. The Montagnards saw in this affinity some indication that the US would support their efforts to break away from the Vietnamese. This feeling was neither openly nor covertly fostered by the US Government or any of its agencies.

In August, 1964, a major outbreak of the Rhade tribe against the Vietnamese government occurred, centered around the USSF camps in BAN ME THOUT. This outbreak, incidentally, resulted in the killing of some Vietnamese Special Forces who, just prior to that time, had been infused into the CIDG camps as camp directors. Apparently this had something to do with the outbreak, as well as the heightening of tensions in general. The Viet Cong began to mount its own offensives in 1964 and 1965 as the situation in the highlands deteriorated.

During the period of rebellion in BAN ME THOUT, there were tensions in USSF camps in PLEIKU and nearby provinces. Led by Colonel Freund (now Brigadier General), the USSF elements and other advisors to the Vietnamese were able to convince the Rhade dissidents (leaders of the

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FULRO movement) that the US would not support their attempts to break away from the Vietnamese, would not recognize their autonomy, and would not support their forces with supplies or by any form of assistance. The outbreak was quelled and tensions were, over a period of time, eased largely by a wise and tolerant policy on the part of the Vietnamese government, which aimed at ameliorating (if not satisfying) some of the legitimate demands of the FULRO leaders and quietly transferring and breaking up dissident groups of these elements.

The FULRO program in 1965 continued as an underground movement, generally directed by the hierarchy in Cambodia. In 1965, a total of 19 demands were made by various FULRO leaders upon the Vietnamese Central Government. These demands included all those mentioned earlier, plus the right of the Montagnards to maintain their own armies of up to 50,000 men, the right to have their own flag, and the right to total autonomy in a certain zone comprising the highlands and, incidentally, some lowland provinces. Various appeals were made to US advisors and directly to the US Ambassador in SAIGON. The US rejected them. At the same time the GVN, largely through the representative of the National Leadership Council in the II Corps Tactical Zone, Major General Vinh Loc, conducted several meetings with FULRO leaders. Some of their more legitimate demands, a total of eight, were met by the Vietnamese government. Among these agreements were the establishment of a broader Montagnard representation in the government, schools for the training of Montagnards for civil service and military positions, preferential treatment for the Montagnards in competing for civil and military positions, and general recognition of Montagnard-Vietnamese equality before the law.

The demands of the Montagnards were in adjudication when additional outbreaks of Montagnard dissidence occurred within the highlands in 1965. Again, the Vietnamese met these outbreaks with tolerance, forbearance, and, for the most part, pressure gently applied.

During 1966 the Vietnamese government has made an all-out effort to bring the FULRO insurgents back into the fold of the Vietnamese nation, pardoning most of the leaders. The attempts at reconciliation have led to a final celebration of Montagnard-Vietnamese unity, which was celebrated in PLEIKU during the period 14 to 17 October 1966. This celebration was attended by many of the lesser leaders of the FULRO movement, but according to best reports, the Chief, Y Bhan, did not attend, nor did some of his major lieutenants. Their activity may now center in the area just over the Cambodian border or just inside the borders of RVN, and it appears that they are watching to see if the promises of the GVN will be carried out - at least in part - prior to their coming back.


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The amity celebrations were culminated 17 October 1966 by an oath-taking ceremony and elaborate surrounding ritual, at which the Premier of Vietnam appeared, accompanied by the Chief of State and various foreign dignitaries and military leaders.

It appears that many of the grievances of the Montagnards have already been ameliorated by action on the part of the Vietnamese. Schools have been set up for the Montagnards, the highlanders are now being infused into the military forces in positions of leadership, there is a genuine attempt to enfranchise the Montagnards (as evidenced by the appointment and election of members from within their midst to the National Constitutional Convention), and a genuine attitude of cooperation and brotherhood appears to be exhibited by the Vietnamese leaders. Hopefully, this will lead to the denouement of FULRO and to a genuine banding of the people of the highlands and the lowlands into a brotherhood which will lead to national unity and strength. A genuine and continuing effort must be made by all sides to heal the breach which FULRO has created, because we are confronted here with much more difficult problems which are being settled by war.

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Inclosure 7

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13. ABSTRACT

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