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HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

2700

AVDDB-12I

27 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Period ending 31 October 1970, RCS SCFOR-65 (R2) (4).

TO: Commanding Officer
2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
ATTN: S-3
APO San Francisco 96262

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

A. General:

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry participated in Operation Putnam Paragon and Putnam Valley.

(2) Task Organization is as shown in Inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and Principal Staff as of the end of the reporting period are as listed at Inclosure 2.

(4) Mission: The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted search operations along the Song Ba River to interdict enemy movement in assigned AO, targeted against the C-2 407 Sapper Battalion. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry also conducted operations in Base area 226 with the mission of locating and destroying enemy forces, supplies and installations. The 1/12th was targeted against the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Regiment of the 3rd NVA Division. On 13 October 1970, the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry initiated operations in the Vinh Thanh Valley, to upgrade the security of the populated areas and to conduct combined operations with Reginal and Popular Forces, to upgrade their capabilities.

B. Intelligence:

(1) Song Ba River area (FSB UTE) 1-9 Aug 70.

a. Terrain: Characterized by low hills with varying slopes from 20% to 30% to as much as 50% and elevation ranging from 200 meters to 300 meters to a maximum of 800 meters. The valleys ranged from less than 1 Km to as much as 3 Km. The southern end of the area of operations was located at the foot hills of the An Khe plain.

b. Vegetation: In Quan An Tuc province (VIC FSB UTE) the vegetation was heavy in the highlands interspersed with some cleared areas on the sides of the hills. The valleys were primarily characterized by thick undergrowth and elephant grass.

c. Weather: Precipitation in the Song Ba River area was light coming in the form of late afternoon and night showers. Mostly clear skies prevailed with ceiling from 5000 to 6000 feet and visibility was good anytime after 0800 hrs. Temperatures ranged from 60 to 90 degrees with the high reached by 1500 hrs.

(2) Phu My and Phu Cat Districts (FSB Augusta)

a. Terrain: Dominated by the Suoi Ca River Valley, which is surrounded by a low land valley, approximately 1 Km wide. The valley floor was once all rice

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GP 4 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

paddies. Surrounding the valley, were moderately steep hills ranging from 300 meters to 700 meters in height. These hills were interspered with intermitiant streams.

b. Vegetation: Characterized by open grassy hills to those of heavy foliage. The valley was open, low grass interspersed with brush. The valley is characterized mostly by rice paddies and crop land, interspersed with some trees.

c. Weather: Precipitation comes in frequent heavy showers, with the mean precipitation being $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches. Mostly clear skies prevail with ceilings at 1000 to 5000 ft. Ground visibility is generally good up to 5 miles and best in the afternoon. Temperatures range from 65 to 95 degrees. Mean temperature is 85 degrees. In the highlands of the districts the minimum precipitation is 6 inches. Maximum in any 24 hour period is 12-15 inches. Cloudiness increases in October. Clouds are formed by mid morning, and break-up at night.

(3) Binh Khe District (FSB Hard Times)

a. Terrain: Dominated by the Song Con River the valley ranges from 1 Km to 4 Km wide. The terrain in the valley is flat. On the east and west side of the valley, the terrain becomes mountainous ranging from 150-500 meters high,

b. Vegetation: On the valley floor the undergrowth sparse; most of the land is under cultivation. In the surrounding mountains the vegetation becomes thick with open areas in places. The vegetation continues to the tops of the mountains.

c. Weather: The weather in the Binh Khe district at Hard Times is influenced by the southwest and northeast moonsoons at this time, generally the precipitation remains low. The majority of the precipitation comes in afternoon showers and thunderstorms. October and November are the wettest months with rain in most areas.

(4) The Enemy

a. Around FSB UTE the enemy was the C-2 Company of the 407th Sapper Battalion. The enemy moved in 3 to 4 man teams and avoided contact. He gathered food from the local Montagnards. The enemy was well equipped, each man usually having a rucksack and a rifle. There were also local VC sympathizers in the valley consisting of Montagnards who carried SKS weapons supplied by the NVA and occassionally sniped at re-supply helicopters.

b. In the Phu My and Phu Cat District areas the 1/12th Inf was operating against the 405th Sapper Battalion (ADA 300th Sapper Battalion) which is composed of 3 companies and one headquarters and support company. The battalion operates throughout the Binh Dinh Province but principally in Hoai An, Phu Cat, Tuy Phu and Phu My districts. The battalion frequently retreats to sanctuaries in the Soui Ca Valley, and Mi Ba Mountain. Battalion strength is approximately 250 men. Each company has approximately 60 men. Their mission is to attack logistic installations as well as allied units in the Qui Nhon area. Companies of the battalion often operate independently, with individual companies occasionally attached to maneuver units that require sapper support. The few incidents encountered were mostly those of small groups 3-4 individuals moving through the area. Our battalion was ambushed only once. The battalion has recieved approximately 15 days of sapper and 15 days of Political training. The battalion recieves some food from the province committee MR-5 which provides funds to purchase the balance of the units food requirements. It is believed that the battalion recieves ammunition and supplies in the vicinity of BR 8363. Combat effectiveness has not really been tested, as the battalion has avoided contact. Morale is considered high.

c. Quan Binh District, the 1/12th Inf was apposed by the C-4 5th Battalion 12th Regiment NVA. their strength is 350 men, their mission is to collect rice

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support the NVA. Several sightings at Grid 637633 indicates a suspected re-supply point. During period 22-28 Sept, leaflets were passed out in Dinh Quan District by 1 Platoon of VC. Vic 658610. The 12th NVA Reg. with 4th, 5th, 6th battalions have the mission of collecting rice, taxes and disrupting VN pacification efforts in the Binh Khe district area. Recent readouts indicate low morale due to food shortages and constant movement. Training courses were recently conducted on ambush and sapper tactics for select members of VC forces. Terrorism directed against hamlets, villages, and VN officials can be expected to increase.

C. Operations: At the beginning of the reporting period, the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry participated in operations Putman Paragon, and was targeted against the C-2 407th Sapper Battalion. The assigned area of operations was the Song Ba River area. The battalion had the mission of interdicting enemy movement along the river and its tributaries. The Battalion CP was located at FSB Ute. Co B located and destroyed 400 lbs. of rice in vicinity BR 291562. On 4 August, Co C initiated contact with 2 enemy, resulting in 2 enemy WIA. One Chinese Communist pistol, one rucksack, and medical supplies were CIA. On 6 August, a stay behind patrol from Company B at coordinates BR 299569, engaged 11 NVA with small arms and mortar fire. A sweep of the suspected enemy location revealed blood trails, with negative further results. On 9 August, the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry returned to Camp Radcliff for a training and refitting standdown. Training was conducted from 11-18 Aug. in the Camp Radcliff area. Training consisted of RTO procedures, patrolling, ambush techniques, small unit leadership and weapons training. Officer classes were also conducted which were primarily directed toward leadership and responsibility.

On 19 August, the 1st Battalion CP was organized at FSB Augusta. On 22 August, Co D, vicinity of BR 758722 found 1 dead enemy soldier, also one other grave about one week old. On August 22, at the night location of Co D, (BR 757724), a trip flare was tripped. Small arms were employed. A check of the enemy location revealed one AK-47 rifle CIA. On 23 August the reconnaissance platoon engaged two enemy at coordinates 757728 with small arms, resulting in one NVA, KIA. At coordinates 757728, at the night location of the Recon platoon a mechanical ambush was tripped resulting in one NVA, KIA, and one AK-47 CIA. At coordinates 760728 on 24 August, the Recon platoon engaged 1 enemy with M-79, resulting in 1 NVA, KIA and three US soldiers WIA by M79 schrapnel. Co D, at coordinates 758727 found a bunker complex, two B-40 rockets, one clip of AK-47 rounds, two NVA steel helmets and assorted clothing. On 25 August a mechanical ambush installed by the Recon platoon, detonated, resulting in the killing of a leopard. On 28 August, Co B at coordinates 793732 found one NVA rucksack plus 100 pounds of AK-47 ammunition. On 3 September Co C, engaged unknown numbers of NVA soldiers. The enemy broke contact, but was pursued by the 1st platoon of Co C. At coordinates BR 793698, the 1st platoon engaged two NVA soldiers resulting in one Kit Carson Scout wounded. Co C captured one rucksack, thirty rounds of AK-47 ammunition and assorted clothing. On 8 September Co B at coordinates BR 809667 found 45 fighting positions approximately six months old. On 8 September the Recon platoon in the vicinity of BR 843710 had one of their mechanical ambushes detonated. Recon platoon saw two enemy flee, and employed small arms fire. Results 1 NVA KIA. On 11 September, in the vicinity of BR 811644 they found 1,000 pounds of rice. The rice was backhauled. On 21 September, four rounds of 82mm mortar landed on FSB Augusta. The suspected enemy mortar location was at BR 784698 and also at BR 778698. The rounds were short of the inhabited friendly locations. There were no casualties. On 22 September 8 rounds of 82mm mortars landed in the kitchen area at FSB Augusta, resulting in

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US KIA and thirteen US, WIA. On 22 September at coordinates 818647, Co D, found one claymore mine, two B40 rockets one 60mm mortar round, one 82mm mortar round, six chicom grenades, fifty rounds of AK-47 ammunition and assorted documents. On 22 September, Recon platoon had one of their mechanical ambushes tripped resulting in one NVA, KIA, also one rucksack and documents CIA. On 23 September Co A at coordinates 819697 received 15 rounds of friendly 82mm mortar fire, resulting in two US, KIA, and four US WIA. Mortars were fired from LZ Washington. On 24 September at coordinates 812658 Co A found a B-40 rocket-booby trap. On 24 September Co D in the vicinity of coordinates 831648 engaged three individuals in their assigned area of operations. Individuals were recognized as ARVN soldiers. No casualties were reported. On 26 September a member of the Recon platoon in the vicinity of BR 827650 tripped a mechanical ambush, resulting in four US KIA, and four US WIA. On 26 September Co A, at BR 803664 found five bunkers, resulting in two M-16 magazines containing ammo, a shovel, oil, documents and batteries CIA. On 29 September, Co D in the vicinity of BR 824665, engaged approximately ten NVA soldiers resulting in one NVA KIA and one NVA WIA (blood trail), CIA one AK-47 rifle. On 29 September, Co A at Br 804665, engaged one enemy soldier, resulting in one enemy KIA. CIA one AK-47 Rifle.

On 1 Oct the 2d platoon of Co B received one casualty by friendly fire as a result of mistaken identity. On 5 October, the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry departed base area 226 and returned to Camp Radcliff for a training & refitting standdown. The battalion moved by a combination of air and vehicle assets, closing Camp Radcliff on 6 October. Training was conducted during period 9-12 October and consisted of weapons training, mechanical ambush training, ambush and patrolling procedures, RTO procedures and small unit tactics.

On 13 October, the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry moved to the Vinh Thanh Valley with the mission of upgrading the security of the populated areas and to conduct combined operations with the Regional Forces, and training teams from the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry moved to and deployed with Popular Forces. Regional Forces were integrated into the U.S. units and the Recon platoon was integrated into a Regional Force Company.

U.S. Military Police units conducted patrol and law and order operations with the National Police and assisted in the training of the National Police by proper application of Police techniques.

A foot bridge was constructed across the Song Con River for merchants and travelers convenience. Another bridge, of permanent status, for vehicle traffic, was also planned in order to further open the Vinh Thanh Valley to vehicle traffic and improve the lines of communication. Also, a school which was destroyed by the enemy was repaired and joint U.S. and Vietnamese ventures were started. These ventures included a South Vietnamese Barber Shop for U.S. soldiers, and a program for the purchasing of Vietnamese goods by U.S. personnel. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry also trained the Regional Forces on the 4.2mm mortars and .50 caliber machine gun. A Vietnamese/English program of language instruction was also instituted at LZ Hard Times.

D. Training:

(1) The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted training whenever it was possible, at Camp Radcliff and at the Fire Support Bases. Generally however the battalion conducted a formal program of instruction while on standdown and conducted weapons training, (to include all organic weapons of the battalion) while at the Fire Support Bases. Classes on RTO procedures, ambushes, patrolling, small unit tactics and mechanical ambush techniques were easily integrated

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into the training program at the Fire Support Bases.

(2) Schools: The battalion received and filled quotas to Division Schools as follows:

	<u>Quota</u>	<u>Attended</u>	<u>Graduated</u>
Division Combat NCO Leadership School	13	13	13
Division Sniper School	5	5	5
Mine Sweep School	3	3	3
LRP	3	0	0

The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry participated in the 4th Infantry Division training program during period 9-12 October, (during the standdown period). The program of instruction was excellent, and well designed, and provided adequate training for troops which have been in the field for extended periods. However, much difficulty was encountered in procuring adequate training aids to perform effective, quality instruction. Most training aids had to be fabricated, and insufficient time was allowed between arrival at Camp Radcliff and the start of the training for this purpose.

E. Logistics:

(1) General: Resupply of forward elements was conducted by air assets and overland convoy. During period 21 August through 4 September, the trains location was LZ Hard Times, from 5 September through 5 October the trains was located at LZ Uplift. During period 13 October to the end of this reporting period, the trains operated from Camp Radcliff. The major problem areas encountered during this period was the unreliability of resupply aircraft, due to their being withdrawn from our control for combat assault operations. However, this system has been revised by allocating one aircraft to each battalion daily with significant improvement in the areas of reliability, flexibility and planning. This unit operated on a 4 day resupply cycle for units in the field.

(2) Supply Activities:

a. Class I: During the above period, hot meals were fed, in Base Camp, Trains and at the Fire Support Base daily. During the latter portion of this reporting period hot meals were also supplied to the forward units in the field on a rotational basis. The following meals by type ration were served:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A-Rations	41,623	41,623	15,091	112,555
C-Rations	14,825	30,602	23,660	69,087
LRRP	1,800	1,950	0	3,750

b. Class II: Due to curtailment of OM&A funds during the latter portion of the reporting period, many items of issue to individuals (i.e. canteens, rucksacks) were in extremely short supply.

c. Class III, LV, V: These classes of supply were readily available at the supply point.

d. Class VI: During period 1 August through 31 October, the following Sundry Packs were issued:

<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
56	63	30	149

(Beer and soda were delivered to units during standdown and soda to units in the field on resupply days.)

e. Class VII: Critical shortages exist in the following items:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Truck, Utility, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	3 ea
Truck, Cargo, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	1 ea
Truck, Cargo, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton	2 ea
Trailer, Water, $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton (400 gals)	1 ea

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Compass, Lensatic	121 ea
Machine Gun, M-60	4 ea
Rifle, M-16	11 ea
PRC 25	11 ea
PRC 77	5 ea

f. (The absence of these items, hampers tactical resupply & mission type operations of this battalion.)

Class VIII: No major resupply problems were encountered in this area.

g. Class IX: Repair parts in general were in short supply throughout this reporting period, due in large part to curtailment of OM&A funds. Additionally, lack of school trained personnel, coupled with a high turnover rate, hampered this unit in this area.

h. Class X: N/A

i. Transportation:

(1) The vehicle support given this unit through DTO from the 4th S&T Battalion and the 8th Transportation Group has been outstanding in every respect.

(2) Maintenance: Overall, the support rendered this battalion by Company C, 704th Maintenance Battalion, has been more than adequate.

(3) Organization: Upon arrival at FSB Augusta, in Eastern Base Area 226, the 82mm mortars of this battalion were deployed with their units in order to afford the Company Commanders greater flexibility of movement and responsive firepower.

F. Strength authorized and assigned strength at the end of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Authorized

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>W.O.</u>	<u>E.M.</u>	<u>AGG</u>
HHC	015	002	147	164
Co A	006	000	158	164
Co B	006	000	158	164
Co C	006	000	158	164
Co D	006	000	158	164
Co E	004	000	096	100
TOTAL	043	002	875	920

(2) Assigned

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>W.O.</u>	<u>E.M.</u>	<u>AGG</u>
HHC	013	002	149	164
Co A	006	000	138	144
Co B	005	000	144	149
Co C	004	000	143	147
Co D	004	000	138	142
Co E	003	000	101	104
TOTAL	035	002	813	850

(3) Replacements and Rotations: The battalion received a total of 23 officers and 422 enlisted replacements. During the same period, our losses were 14 officers and 371 enlisted men.

(4) Casualties

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUG</u>			<u>SEP</u>			<u>OCT</u>		
	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA
HHC	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	3	0
Co A	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	0
Co B	1	2	0	2	16	0	0	0	0
Co C	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	0

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Co D	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Co E	0	3	0	4	6	0	0	0	0

G. Morale and Personnel Services

(1) Awards:

<u>DFC</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>BS "V"</u>	<u>BS</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>ACM "V"</u>	<u>ACM</u>
1	1	3	30	46	169	19	218

(2) Public Information: During the period, 26 stories, 19 rolls of film and 566 home town news releases were turned in to division.

(3) Promotions - Enlisted: During the period the battalion had 123-E4, 74-E5 and 3-E6 promotions.

H. Medical:

(1) On 10 August 1970, all medics and members of the company field sanitation teams received instruction on field sanitation by the Battalion Surgeon. In addition, all medics received training in the treatment of common diseases that arise in the field.

(2) All companies received training on malaria, VD, and Drug Abuse by members of the Division Surgeon's Office during 8-11 October 1970.

(3) Two medics were working with the battalion S-5 Team in the villages of An Dien Bac and An Binh. During the visits, 600 plague immunizations were accomplished and approximately 30 to 40 people were treated per day. The use of MEDCAP'S can be best utilized through instruction of sanitation which could greatly decrease the disease rate of the Vietnamese populace.

I. Civil Action:

In addition to the accomplishments cited in #3 above, the Battalion S-5 Team also instituted several new programs. A basic soap and water program taught the Vietnamese people the fundamentals of sanitation, S-5 personnel also instructed them in basic first aid. This instruction was so successful that the villagers are now able to treat themselves. Furthermore, the team conducted DENTCAPS on a weekly basis in the AO. This operation was initiated in mid-July and is presently continuing with very successful results. Both An Dien Bac and An Binh villages participated in joint construction programs. These include bridge repair, building a new playground, and constructing new administration building.

J. Lessons Learned:

- (1) (U) Personnel - None
- (2) (U) Operation

Observations: This unit received several injuries from enemy mortar fire because personnel ran for bunders instead of lying down when the rounds came in.

Evaluation: All permanent Fire Support Bases should have sufficient overhead protection for all personnel. Duties require most personnel to be outside their bunkers during working hours. Therefore, personnel must know what to do if they are caught in the open in a mortar attack.

Recommendation: That all newly assigned personnel be instructed and drilled in the correct action to take during mortar attacks. FSB SOP's should include warning signals and practice alerts should be held frequently.

Observation: The monthly malaria rate in this unit has been reduced from twenty plus, to five or six cases. One month there were no cases reported.

Evaluation: Previously, all required pills and mosquito nets were made available but little emphasis was placed on insuring their use. With increased interest in this area and frequent inspections of malaria rosters and sleeping quarters for the use of mosquito nets, a great reduction in malaria cases was noted.

Recommendation: That all units have a strong policy and inspection procedure

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for unit malaria rosters. Comparisons can be made between units that maintain rosters and those who do not. The ones who don't will have the greater number of malaria cases.

Observation: This unit employed stay behind ambushes which did not obtain desired results because members of the ambush were not psychologically prepared for the lucrative target that appeared.

Evaluation: Stay behind ambushes can be effectively employed on evacuated FSB's, patrol bases and similiar positions when friendly units withdraw. The chances are extremely good that enemy personnel will move into and evacuated friendly position within hours. This is especially true if C-Ration boxes and other inviting material is left in the area.

Recommendation: Units must be specifically trained in the employment of stay behind ambushes on evacuated friendly positions in Vietnam. Training must include selection of weapons, cover and concealment, alertness and eagerness to make an easy kill.

Observation: Many civil action projects when completed by American personnel are not held in high regard by the Vietnamese.

Evaluation: Vietnamese people must engage in the actual construction of a project if it is expected to achieve the desired results. If a project, which is constructed solely by American personnel, fails for some reason, it is regarded as a monument to American ineptness.

Recommendation: Vietnamese personnel should on all projects provide the manpower for the actual construction work, while American personnel act in primarily an advisory capacity.

Observation: When a definite promise is made to a Vietnamese, he expects it to be carried out regardless of any interim problems.

Evaluation: Promises made definite in nature, should be fulfilled if at all possible.

Recommendation: Insure that in dealing with the Vietnamese people everything is placed on an indefinite rather than a definite nature (i.e. "I'll try" rather than "I will").

Observation: Projects which are initiated without either the knowledge or the approval of the village/hamlet chief could strain American - Vietnamese relations and lead to the failure of the project or program.

Evaluation: The village/hamlet chief is a very respected personage in his respective village/hamlet. According to custom and common sense he should be notified of any new projects which are to be conducted in his village, in order that he may either give his approval, disapproval, or make suggestions.

Recommendation: Before initiating any Civil Affairs action, which is new, coordination should be made with the local village/hamlet chief as well as the district officials.

- (3) (U) Training: None
- (4) (U) Intelligence: None
- (5) (U) Logistics: None
- (6) (U) Organization: None
- (7) (U) Tactical Cover and Deception: None

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LTC, Infantry
Commanding

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Inlosure (1) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (Commanders & Personnel Staff)

1. (G) Task organization as of 1 August 1970 with supporting forces.

1/12th Infantry	1 Aug 70 to 31 Sep 70	MAJ Thomas Sigelosee
B/4-42 Artillery	1 Aug 70 to 31 Oct 70	MAJ Charles Woodcock
2/3/C-4th Engineer	1 Aug 70 to 30 Oct 70	MAJ Douglas Hinesch
		MAJ Lawrence Janssen III

2. (G) Effective 5 October delete B/4-42 Artillery. Liska

3. (G) Effective 5 October delete 2/3/C-4th Engineer. Clemente

4. (G) Task Organization as of 13 October 1970. Jones

1/12th Infantry	1 Aug 70 to 31 Oct 70	MAJ Robert Finney
A/4-42 Artillery	1 Aug 70 to 31 Oct 70	MAJ Rodney Williams
1/D 4th Engineer	1 Aug 70 to 31 Oct 70	MAJ Francis Conner
/E 4th Engineer	1 Aug 70 to 31 Oct 70	MAJ Don Smith
2/3/C-4th Engineer	1 Aug 70 to 31 Oct 70	MAJ Richard Cincalala
4/2/4th MP Co	1 Aug 70 to 31 Oct 70	MAJ John P. Smith
		MAJ Sanford Johnson
		MAJ Wade Kottler
		MAJ Robert Jones
		MAJ Richard Higgins
		MAJ Thomas Bryson
		MAJ Richard Wise

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Inclesure (2) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (Commanders & Principle Staff)

1. Bn Co	1 Aug 70 to 30 Oct 70	LTC Arthur Harris
2. Bn XO	1 Aug 70 to 27 Sep 70	MAJ Thomas Nicholson
	27 Sep 70 to 30 Oct 70	MAJ Charles Woodbeck
3. Bn S1	1 Aug 70 to 7 Oct 70	1LT Douglas Haneeck
	7 Oct 70 to 30 Oct 70	1LT Lawrence Semmers III
4. Bn S2	1 Aug 70 to 10 Sep 70	CPT John Plichta
	10 Sep 70 to 14 Oct 70	1LT Dave Fisher
	14 Oct 70 to 30 Oct 70	1LT Charles Clements
5. Bn S3	1 Aug 70 to 10 Sep 70	MAJ Chester Garrett
	27 Sep 70 to 30 Oct 70	MAJ Thomas Nicholson
6. Bn S4	1 Aug 70 to 13 Aug 70	CPT Blynn Scott
	13 Aug 70 to 30 Oct 70	CPT Robert Pierce
7. Bn S5	1 Aug 70 to 13 Aug 70	1LT Rodney Williams
	13 Aug 70 to 30 Oct 70	1LT Francis Cesare
8. HHC	1 Aug 70 to 30 Oct 70	CPT Don Smith
9. A Co	1 Aug 70 to 12 Sep 70	1LT Richard Giccelella
	12 Sep 70 to 30 Oct 70	CPT John Plichta
10. B Co	1 Aug 70 to 30 Oct 70	CPT Sanfred Cethren
11. C Co	1 Aug 70 to 30 Oct 70	CPT Wade Nettles
12. D Co	1 Aug 70 to 12 Sep 70	CPT Ernest Jones
	12 Sep 70 to 30 Oct 70	CPT Richard Hickson
13. E Co	1 Aug 70 to 17 Oct 70	1LT Thomas Drummend
	17 Oct 70 to 30 Oct 70	1LT Richard Wise

7. Intelligence:

(1) Song Ba River area (VIC 702 700) 1-9 Aug 70.

a. Terrain: Characterized by low hills with varying elevations from 200 to 300 meters to as much as 500 meters and elevation ranging from 200 meters to 300 meters to a maximum of 500 meters. The valleys ranged from less than 1 km to as much as 3 km. The southern end of the area of operations was located at the foot hills of the An Khe plain.

b. Vegetation: In some of the province (VIC 702 700) the vegetation was heavy in the highland? heavily forested with some cleared areas on the sides of the hills. The valleys were generally characterized by thick undergrowth and elephant grass.

c. Weather: Precipitation in the Song Ba River area was in the range of the foot of late afternoon and night showers. Mostly clear skies prevailed with rainfall from 70% to 80% and visibility was good during after 0800 hours. Approximate amount 2000 mm per year with the high season by 1500 mm.

(2) Phu My and Phu My (VIC 702 700)

a. Terrain: Dominated by the Phu My river valley, which is surrounded by a low land valley, approximately 1 km wide. The valley floor was once all rice

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